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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Refugees at Center Stage
R efugee policy has been one of the contradictory strains running
through American foreign policy since World War II. Its develop-
ment reflects our changing understanding of national self-interest in the
face of radical and gradual change around the world and our willingness
to extend special generosity to certain groups of desperate uprooted peo-
ples. Out of this mixture of motives has developed a hybrid creature
known as refugee law, a field more overtly responsive to political shifts
than many others but a field that nonetheless looks to traditional con-
cepts of law for guidance.
On March 17, 1980, President Carter signed the Refugee Act of 1980
(Refugee Act) thus concluding several years of work and study by Con-
gress, the Executive, and voluntary agencies in drafting a comprehensive
approach to admitting refugees abroad and resettling them in cities of the
United States. The Refugee Act modernized the definition of refugee in
United States law, established a system of shared responsibility between
Congress and the Administration in admitting refugees, and provided a
framework for federal economic and educational assistance in refugee re-
settlement to localities.
Although the Refugee Act was intended to resolve political debate over
refugee policy and law for years to come, the debate has actually intensi-
fied. Like other works of synthesis, the Refugee Act serves to amend past
errors rather than to predict future trouble spots. Most significantly,
waves of asylum seekers from the Caribbean, Central America and even
remote parts of Asia, Africa and Europe have challenged the basic pre-
mise of the Refugee Act: that refugees would be admitted in an orderly
process after gaining approval and visas from United States authorities
overseas.
2
New political realities have run roughshod over prior assumptions. Five
years ago, 3,702 aliens in the United States applied for asylum, but in the
12 months following the passage of the Refugee Act, more than that many
applied each month. Between April and September 1980, approximately
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)).
2 See Hearings on the Caribbean Refugee Crisis: Cubans and Haitians Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-51 (1980) (statement of Victor H. Palmieri, U.S.
Coord. for Refugee Affairs).
S Hearings on S. 1765 Before Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Doris Meissner, Acting
Comm'r of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)) (available on microfiche
through 1982 Congressional Information Service, (CIS) ANN. AB., No. S521-44.1), reprinted
in condensed form in Meissner, Proposed Revisions in Asylum Procedures and Law, INS
REP., Spring-Summer-Fall 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Meissner Testimony].
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125,000 Cubans sailed from Mariel Harbor to Key West, Florida." In that
same year, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appre-
hended about 15,000 Haitians without visas, many of whom applied for
asylum,6 along with large numbers of Salvadorans,' Ethiopians,7 and
Iranians8 either with invalid visas or with no visas at all. Until the Refu-
gee Act, America's declared refugee policy was expressly anti-Communist,
but the new law abandoned the Cold War refugee definition of a genera-
tion ago for the nonpartisan definition of the United Nations Convention
on Refugees. The question being asked by these refuge seekers is whether
anything has changed.
Recent events have provoked considerable disagreement among the
branches of government as to ways in which to deal with the mass asylum
problem. To the Carter Administration, the 1980 Mariel-Key West flotilla
was a major international crisis. First it welcomed the refugees, then it
sought to stem the tide by arresting boat captains and impounding their
fishing boats. Eventually the President used the Attorney General's emer-
gency parole power authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act of
19529 (INA) to admit the Cubans 0 despite the fact that the elimination
of mass refugee parole was one of the main goals of the Refugee Act."
The Reagan Administration issued an executive order for the interdiction
of boats outside the territorial waters of the United States "when there is
reason to believe that such vessels are engaged in the irregular transpor-
tation of persons or violations of United States Law.' 2 Over the past few
' Copeland, The 1980 Cuban Crisis: Some Observations, J. ow REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
Aug. 1981, at 22.
5 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1982, at 28. The magazine's cover story, characteristic of popular
reporting of this issue, shows a black man in prison denim peering through a wire fence. The
headline: The Haitians: Refugees or Prisoners?
' The Plain Dealer, Feb. 10, 1982, at 1-A, col. 7.
7 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at A3, col. 3 (Chicago ed.).
' See generally Meissner Testimony, supra note 3, at 1.
9 Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in sections of titles 8, 15, 18,
22, 49, & 50 U.S.C. (1982)).
-0 INA, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982). See infra note 25 and accompanying
text.
" See Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (1982) (amending INA,
§ 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976)); Kennedy, The Refugee Act of 1980, INT'L Mi-
GRATION REV., Spring- Summer 1981, at 141-56 (Symposium on Refugee Asylum: Policy and
Legislative Developments).
The decision not to admit the Cubans as refugees represented a change in United States
refugee policy in that for the first time the Mariel Cubans were not classified as escapees
from communism but as migrants from the Caribbean. This paved the way for the joint
consideration of Haitians and Cubans.
12 Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). The Reagan Administration also
sponsored the Emergency Interdiction Act to give statutory authority to such interdictions
on the high seas. See S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sass., 127 CONG. REc. S11,993 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1981) (Omnibus Immigration Control Act) [hereinafter cited as Administration
bill). This bill did not pass during the 1981-82 session and has been overshadowed by the
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years federal courts in California and Florida have issued major injunc-
tions against the Immigration and Naturalization Service in class action
suits on behalf of tens of thousands of asylum seekers.13
In addition to the detention of thousands of Haitians, Salvadorans and
others who are potential candidates for refugee status under United
States law, there has been an ongoing political debate in Congress over
bills that would make it more difficult for undocumented people to stay
in the United States. On the last day of the 97th Session of Congress the
House failed to reach a vote on a major immigration and asylum bill-the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill14-that had already passed the Senate. Slightly dif-
ferent versions of this bill were reintroduced in Congress in February
1983.'5
B. Summary
Refugee policy and law have developed largely in an ad hoc manner, as
the nation has responded to crises around the world with both altruism
and political self-interest. Against the foreground of refugee and asylum
claims by unfortunate individuals there has been an unending struggle
among the three branches of the United States government to make the
rules for handling these claims.
Part II discusses the way refugee policy became a weapon in the Cold
War and the formal abandonment of that approach with the adoption of
the 1980 Refugee Act. Part III contains an analysis of the claims of indi-
viduals fleeing authoritarian regimes friendly to the United States; the
interplay of political and humanitarian factors in the case of El Salvador;
and an inquiry into the reasons why individuals become refugees. Part IV
focuses on the statutes and regulations that govern the withholding of
deportation and the granting of asylum; it touches on the inherent con-
flict between foreign policy dealing with state-to-state relations and indi-
vidual claims of persecution, the judiciary's power to review decisions of
the State Department and the INS, and the current debate in Congress
Simpson-Mazzoli bill which omits the provision empowering the President to seize ships.
See infra note 14.
13 Among the cases that will be discussed in greater detail are Haitian Refugee Center v.
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd and modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (enjoining INS from summary asylum hear-
ings held to violate due process of law); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(ordering release from detention of Haitian asylum applicants on grounds that INS
rulemaking violated the law and failed to give fair notice to those affected by substantive
rule); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (imposing on INS
requirements of providing notice to Salvadorans of right to apply for asylum and of other
procedural rights).
" The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 was introduced on March 17, 1982,
by Senator Alan Simpson and Representative Romano Mazzoli as S. 2222 and H.R. 5827,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2306 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982).
" See infra note 163.
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over new legislation on illegal immigration and asylum procedures.
Part V concerns the specific rights and privileges afforded the benefi-
ciaries of United States refugee law and the proposed solutions devised to
permit several hundred thousand Cubans and Haitians to remain in the
United States without recognizing their persecution claims. This part also
discusses two important cases that have placed limits on the power of the
INS to treat potential asylum applicants in summary fashion. The con-
clusion suggests that although there may be costs involved in limiting
governmental discretion to deal with refuge-seekers in the most expedient
fashion, the best long-range resolution to the debate now underway is to
allow the parties to it to continue exploring the American commitment to
providing a haven for refugees in a changing world.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF REFUGEE POLICY
Modern American refugee law is the child of the mass population dislo-
cation and the ideology-charged atmosphere that followed World War II.
Migration to the United States had been radically limited by the Immi-
gration Act of 1924.16 In an effort to stabilize Western Europe and pro-
vide homes for a half-million homeless people, 7 Congress enacted a series
of statutes in the post-World War II decades authorizing visas over and
above ordinary immigration quotas.'8
16 The National Origins Act, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed 1952).
The Act reduced annual immigration quotas to 2 % of the number of persons of any nation-
ality in the United States in 1890. This resulted in a considerable drop in immigration,
especially of nationalities that had arrived in large numbers after the 1890 census, such as
Eastern and Southern Europeans.
17 In his Special Message to Congress on Admission of Displaced Persons, President Tru-
man wrote: "The German economy, so devastated by war and so badly crowded with the
return of people of German origin from neighboring countries, is approaching an economic
suffocation which in itself is one of our major problems." PUB. PAPERS: HARRY S. TRUMAN
328 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Special Message].
"' Chief among these were the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62
Stat. 1009 (ultimately granting 400,000 visas to refugees and displaced persons in Europe;
originally these visas were meant to count against country quotas, but the Act permitted the
mortgaging of present entries against future numbers, and these future mortgaged quotas
were expunged by the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957); the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (permitting 254,000 non-quota visas to be granted to refu-
gees, escapees and expellees); the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71
Stat. 639 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)) (extending the use
of unclaimed visas for European refugees, expellees and escapees and for refugees from the
Middle East); the Fair Share Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)) (pledging that the United States would
take 25 % of all refugees who were resettled by other countries under mandate of the United
Nations High Commission on Refugees).
1983-84]
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A. Persecution and Ideology
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 adopted the refugee definition' 9
used by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the United Na-
tions agency which helped dislocated survivors of World War II. This
definition focused on persecution as the key factor in determining status
as a refugee. To be eligible for IRO assistance, one had to prove "persecu-
tion or fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race,
religion, nationality or political opinions."20 This approach was adopted
in somewhat expanded form in the 1951 United Nations Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees,2 1 the refugee Magna Carta, which is still
the basic international statement on the rights and status of refugees.
Under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations the main thrust of
United States foreign policy was the containment of communism. Refugee
policy was an ideological weapon in the Communist-Free World competi-
tion.2 Under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Congress specified that ref-
ugees must come from communist or communist-dominated countries,2 3 a
criterion of American refugee policy which departed from the nonpartisan
approach of the IRO's successor, the United Nations High Commission on
Refugees (UNHCR).
Both the Displaced Persons Act and the Refugee Relief Act contained
,9 Displaced Person Act of 1948, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009.
"0 IRO Constitution, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 3050, T.I.A.S.
No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 19. The relationship between the IRO and United States law has
recently surfaced in denaturalization proceedings of persons accused of collaborating with
the Nazis in persecuting civilians. The Displaced Persons Act made those who "assisted the
enemy in persecuting civil populations" ineligible for visas, and service as a concentration
camp guard was prima facie evidence of such persecution under the IRO. Federenko v.
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). In Federenko and in United States v. Demjanjuk,
518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), persons who fled the Ukraine and later worked as
concentration camp guards were found to have obtained American citizenship by material
misrepresentation through reliance on IRO displaced person status erroneously given and
through non-disclsoure of their activities during the war.
" Adopted and opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter cited
as Refugee Convention]. The Refugee Convention applied the term refugee to persons so
defined under a number of previous refugee arrangements, as well as the IRO Constitution,
and added persecution on grounds of "membership of a particular social group" to the valid
grounds for obtaining refugee status. Id. at 151. The United States did not sign the Refugee
Convention but did sign the accompanying Protocol adopted by the United Nations in 1967.
See infra note 30.
"' See, e.g., Special Message, supra note 17, at 329. "These are people who oppose totali-
tarian rule . . . and who because of their burning faith in the principles of freedom and
democracy have suffered untold privation and hardship. Because they are not communists
and are opposed to communism they have staunchly resisted all efforts to induce them to
return to communist controlled areas." Id. President Eisenhower used similar ideas in his
recommendation of emergency legislation for refugee admissions. "These Refugees and Es-
capees searching desperately for freedom look to the free world for haven." PUB. PAPERS:
DwIGHT D. EiSENHOWER 191 (1952).
" Refugee Relief Act of 1953, § 2(a)-(c), 67 Stat. 400, 400.
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sunset provisions,24 and in subsequent years, when an administration
wanted to admit refugees, it used emergency powers there being no ex-
press statutory authority. The INA authorized the Attorney General to
use discretionary power to "parole" otherwise inadmissible aliens into the
United States.2 5 Although not originally intended to be used in refugee
admissions, under section 212(d)(5), parole became the mechanism by
which the government enacted the refugee component of its foreign pol-
icy. Beginning with 925 World War II orphans in 1956 and 32,000 Hun-
garians a year later, one million refugees including Cubans, Indochinese,
Soviets and Ugandans have been paroled into the country.2 6
In 1965, Congress amended the INA to provide for the admission of
refugees as part of the regular admission process. Refugees became the
seventh category in the preference system adopted by the 1965 amend-
ments, with six percent of all visas allotted to refugees.2 Refugee status
was available to persons fleeing communism and the Middle East.28 While
Cold War antagonisms were by then muted by the ideals of peaceful co-
existence, American foreign policy continued to view persecution as the
exclusive province of communism.
2 9
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees 0 in 1967. The Protocol is an international
treaty incorporating the substance of the 1951 Refugee Convention, under
2 The Displaced Persons Act provided for above-quota visas to be mortgaged against
future national quotas for two fiscal years. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, § 3(a), 62 Stat.
1009, 1010.
The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 limited the total number of nonquota immigrant visas
available to 205,000 with the expectation that the program would terminate no later than
June 1957. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, §§ 3, 19, 67 Stat. 400, 401, 407.
" Section 212(d)(5) of the INA gave the Attorney General discretion to allow aliens into
the country "temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982).
26 INS REP., Fall 1979, at 1-3.
"7 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (repealed 1980).
The seventh preference did not take effect until 1968 and was not extended to the Western
Hemisphere until the INA amendments of 1976 which ended hemispheric inequities of the
past.
" See Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 528,
540-41 (1975).
29 The United States is not alone in mixing refugee policy and foreign policy. The Soviet
Constitution of 1977 reads: "The USSR affords the right of asylum to aliens persecuted for
the defense of workers' interests and the cause of peace, for participation in revolutionary
and national liberation movements and for progressive social and political, scientific or
other creative activity." KONSTITUTSIA (OsNoVNOI ZAKON) SOYUZA SOVYETSKIKH SOTSIALIS-
TICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK (Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
art. 38 (USSR). This definition, which focuses on activities deemed in the Soviet national
interest, also runs counter to the nonpartisan approach to asylum and persecution in the
Refugee Convention.
30 Opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter cited as Refugee Protocol or Protocol].
1983-841
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which the signatories assume binding international obligations with re-
gard to refugees. When he transmitted the Protocol to the Senate for ap-
proval as a treaty, President Johnson wrote that although assent would
not alter American law, it would promote "our traditional role of leader-
ship" in refugee assistance and would generally increase awareness of the
plight of refugees.3 1 The Protocol, which was approved by the Senate and
entered into force on November 1, 1968, has been held to be a self-exe-
cuting treaty and is part of the statutory framework of rights available to
persons claiming fear of persecution.2
American accession to the Protocol pointed out the discrepancy be-
tween our anti-Communist definition of persecution and the universal
definition found in the Refugee Convention. This fact generated court
challenges to INS actions and regulations. But a more important impetus
to overhaul the United States refugee policy and law was provided by the
Vietnam war and the attendant conflict between the Executive and Con-
gress. In the wake of the American withdrawal from Vietnam, tens of
thousands of refugees poured into Southeast Asia. The United States felt
an obligation to assist these refugees, and the only method available,
short of a new statute, was parole, which entailed Executive discretion as
to which and how many refugees to admit.34
B. The 1980 Refugee Act
In 1978 Congress began to search for a new format to reinstate legisla-
tive control over this country's refugee policy.3 5 The 1980 Refugee Act
represents its attempt to unite congressional initiative in refugee poli-
cymaking with Executive flexibility in responding to emergencies. The
Refugee Act provides for a system of consultation prior to the start of
each fiscal year, under which the President reports to Congress on the
world refugee picture. On the basis of this report, Congress authorizes the
"normal flow" refugee admissions for the upcoming year. 6 Refugee ad-
31 PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 868 (1968).
3' In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 313 (1968).
33 Id.
" Between 1975 and 1979, 290,075 Indochinese refugees were paroled into the United
States. INS REP., Fall 1979, at 3.
35 S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 141, 142-43 [hereinafter cited as SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT].
"' The Act makes provision for both a "normal flow" number of refugees and an emer-
gency admission of refugees. For 1980, 1981 and 1982, the President was authorized to ad-
mit 50,000 normal flow refugees per year, with consultation mandatory for any numbers in
excess of 50,000. For 1981, 1982, and 1983, refugee authorizations after consultation were
217,000, 140,000, and 90,000, respectively. Presidential Determinations No. 80-28, 45 Fed.
Reg. 68,365 (1980); No. 82-1, 46 Fed. Reg. 55,233 (1981); and No. 83-2, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,483
(1982). Details of the consultation method are contained in § 207(a)-(d) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)-(d) (1982). The experience to date is that the President asks for greater
numbers of refugee authorizations, Congress asks for fewer, and a compromise figure is
[Vol. 32:117
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missions are separate from other quotas.
The Refugee Act contains special provisions for additional emergency
admissions for which consultation with Congress is required."7 The parole
of refugees under section 212(d)(5) is expressly precluded unless the At-
torney General determines that compelling reasons exist for not using ei-
ther the normal flow or emergency admission channels. s s The Refugee
Act also eliminates ideological and geographic restrictions on the refugee
definition by adopting the terminology of the United Nations Refugee
Convention. Emphasizing this point, President Carter stated upon signing
the Refugee Act that it provides "a new admissions policy that will per-
mit fair and equitable treatment of refugees in the U.S. regardless of their
country of origin.' '..
All refugee and asylum provisions-the issuance of refugee visas under
INA section 207, the granting of asylum under INA section 208 and the
withholding under INA section 243(h) of deportation in order to avoid
persecution-have been brought into conformity with those of the United
Nations Refugee Convention. Under current United States law, a refugee
is now a person who has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of
persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion."4
Mere proof that an individual falls within the refugee definition does
not, of course, guarantee admission to the United States. The United
States can hardly be expected to provide a haven for ten to fifteen million
refugees throughout the world. The Refugee Act specifies that admissions
will "be allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States."'4 1 Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees,
which reported the Refugee Act, cautioned against a restrictive definition
of the terms "humanitarian concern to the United States," although a
greater sensitivity to human rights considerations at the expense of for-
eign policy is suggested.4 2 As some predicted, however, the changed termi-
found.
37 See supra note 36.
38 See supra note 11. While President Carter may have acted within the letter of the law
in paroling the Cubans as entrants and not refugees, it would seem he violated the spirit of
the law, which was to encourage congressional involvement in refugee affairs.
39 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 503 (1980-81).
40 INA, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
"' INA, § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) (1982).
4' The Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
The bill does not, and cannot, explicitly define what refugees are deemed to be "of
special concern to the United States." . . . However, the past can, and will, serve
as a guide .... Group refugee admissions have generally been concerned with
classes of refugees from countries where, for example, the United States has had
strong historic or cultural ties, or where we have been directly involved or have
had treaty obligations. We have also admitted refugees to promote family reunion;
to respond to human rights concerns embodied in the Universal Declaration of
1983-841
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nology has not automatically translated into changed refugee admission
practices."3 Refugee quotas since the Refugee Act indicate that preference
continues to be given to persons fleeing communism in Indochina and
Eastern Europe, while refugees from Latin America, the Caribbean and
Africa have received scant consideration.4 4
III. CHALLENGE TO THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
A. Alternatives to Persecution
Although the new definition of refugee in the Refugee Act represents a
genuine step away from past stereotypes, would-be refugees have not
been content to applaud politely. In many cases people seeking protection
from persecution represent nationalities that have not been favored by
United States refugee or immigration policies in the past.45 In pressing
their claims, refugees are challenging a policy which is a generation old
and a conception of refugeehood that denies special consideration to per-
sons fleeing civil war or mass poverty attributable in part to policies of
friendly authoritarian regimes. In geopolitical terms, they are confronting
an East-West refugee policy and asserting for consideration a North-
South policy.4
6
The idea that persecution is the hallmark of the refugee emerged after
Human Rights; to fulfill foreign policy interests; and, when no other country has
responded to the needs of the homeless, we have opened our door.
SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 146-47.
" See, e.g., Note, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy versus Asylum Practice, 7
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107, 127 (1978). Particularly revealing here are reports of
discussions with anonymous U.S. State Department officials.
"' In FY 1981 actual refugee admissions by area were: Asia (125,000); USSR (14,300);
Africa (2,200); Latin America/Caribbean (2,000); East Europe (6,500); Middle East
(4,000)-a total of 154,000, well below the 211,000 authorized. Cohodas, Committee Starting
Work on Immigration Law Reform, 1981 CONG. Q. WEEKLY Rr. 2067, 2068. Authorizations
for FY 1982 were: Asia (100,000); East Europe and USSR (29,000); Africa (3,000); and for
FY 1983: East Asia (64,000); East Europe and USSR (15,000); Near East and South Asia
(6,000); Africa (3,000); Latin America/Caribbean (2,000). Presidential Determinations 80-28,
82-1 and 83-2 supra note 36.
11 It has been noted that the present immigration preference system, which emphasizes
family ties, perpetuates the current ethnic mix in the United States by limiting immigration
to nationalities of citizens and legal permanent residents. Because there has been minimal
official immigration from countries such as Haiti or El Salvador in the past, legal immigra-
tion through existing channels on any significant scale is not available to citizens of those
countries. For example, in the year ending September 30, 1977, only 251 preference immi-
grants arrived from Haiti compared to over 15,000 each from China, Korea and the Philip-
pines. 1977 INS ANN. REP. 45, 46.
" James Nafziger notes that while restrictive emigration is an issue over which Western
nations criticize Eastern nations, rigid immigration policy is an area in which the East can
strike back at the West. Nafziger, The Right of Migration Under the Helsinki Accords,
1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 395, 409.
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World War II."' Even today refugee is both a popular word and a legal
term of art, and the two are used interchangeably by governments and
laymen.4 It must be presumed, for example, that the UNHCR, which fol-
lows the Refugee Convention, does not apply its own definition of perse-
cution strictly when it estimates that there are sixteen countries in the
world that are each providing temporary or permanent homes for 100,000
or more refugees.40
Certain international refugee instruments take a broader view as well.
The Organization of African Unity defines refugee both as one fleeing
persecution and as one who "owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order . . . is
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence. .... ,,50
Persecution has been highlighted in most (although not all) United
States refugee legislation. Displaced persons under the 1948 Act were not
necessarily persecutees but also people uprooted by World War II;"' the
1953 Refugee Relief Act extended eligibility to persons fleeing military
operations as well as those fleeing persecution;5 2 and the 1965 amend-
ments made refugees from natural calamities eligible for seventh prefer-
ence status.5 3 None of these exceptions to the general rule is incorporated
into the Refugee Act of 1980. The refugee bill that originated in the Sen-
ate did refer to "displaced persons," as persons displaced in their own
country by civil or military disturbance or arbitrary detention. 4 This ter-
minology was rejected by the House, perhaps out of fear that deviation
from an emphasis on political persecution would open the floodgates to
4, 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-89 (1968).
48 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 61, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S3419 (daily ed. Apr. 7,
1981), calling on the President to *proclaim African Refugee Relief Day to focus attention on
African refugees escaping the "ravages of armed conflict, drought and political unrest." Id.
at S3419.
4 Refugees: A Joint Publication of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees and
U.S. Voluntary Agencies, Fall 1981, at 7. Heading the list are Pakistan (with approximately
2 million refugees), the United States (849,000), Somalia (approximately 700,000), and the
Sudan (500,000).
50 O.A.U. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
Sept. 10, 1969, art. I, § 2, reprinted in A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 163, 164
(1980).
5, Displaced Persons Act of 1948, § 2(b), (c), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009, incorporating pt. I, § A,
2, 3 of annex I to the IRO Convention.
5 Refugee Relief Act of 1953, § 2(a), (b), 67 Stat. 400, 400 (distinguishing refu-
gees-people fleeing persecution, natural calamity or military actions-from escapees and
expellees as those fleeing persecution only).
" INA, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (repealed 1980). This provision required a Presiden-
tial directive in order to be effective. None was ever issued. See also Act of Sept. 2, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-892, 72 Stat. 1712 (allotting non-quota refugee visas to Portuguese nation-
als uprooted by floods, volcanoes and earthquakes in the Azores).
" H. R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 160, 160 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT].
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migrants instead of refugees. Even so, the House Committee felt com-
pelled to state that the new definition of refugee would not result in a
wholesale refugee influx." The Conference Committee decided to include
persons subjected to persecution in their homelands, but not displaced
persons per se."
B. The El Salvador Debate
The refugee definition has an effect on policy that extends beyond indi-
vidual case determinations to general presumptions about groups of
aliens. The civil unrest in El Salvador has placed this issue in sharp per-
spective. While there is a history of illegal immigration to the United
States from El Salvador, the recent civil war in that Central American
country has substantially increased the number of uprooted Salvadorans
throughout the Americas. 57 The INS has treated these people as illegal
migrants, either persuading them to depart voluntarily or subjecting them
to mandatory deportation.5 8
In April 1981, Senator Kennedy asked the State Department to take
into account the violence in El Salvador in assessing the nature of the
Salvadoran influx. Although he implied that the Salvadoran refugees
might not necessarily meet the terms of the refugee standard, Kennedy
asked the State Department to recommend to the INS "blanket volun-
tary departure" for Salvadorans. 9 Under this relaxed policy, which has
been extended in the past to other groups seeking haven from civil
strife,60 no Salvadoran would be forced to return to El Salvador. Instead,
15 H. R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG. SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IMMIG. POLICY AND LAW 318,
327 (1980).
" INA, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982). The extension of refugee status to
persons persecuted in their homeland appears to be of more theoretical than practical
benefit.
" The Central American Refugee Center in Washington estimates that there are 500,000
Salvadorans living illegally in the United States. From October 1980 through September
1981 the INS apprehended 15,901 Salvadorans without immigration documents. The Plain
Dealer, March 19, 1982, at 14-A col. 1. See also Report of United Nations High Comm'r for
Refugees Mission to Monitor INS Asylum Processing of Salvadoran Illegal En-
trants-September 13-18, 1981, reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Report of Comm'r].
58 Report of Comm'r, 128 CONG. REC. at S829 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982).
5' Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Jud.
Comm. Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy to Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Sec. of
State (April 6, 1981), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S831 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982). Voluntary
departure is the immigration status of an alien who is deportable but who is permitted to
stay in the United States until he or she departs voluntarily, that is, chooses to leave by a
certain deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1983). Blanket voluntary departure refers to the
extension of this status to members of a class, usually deportable nationals of a given
country.
60 Groups that could not meet the § 203(a)(7) refugee test but were accorded blanket
[Vol. 32:117
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such refugees could stay in the United States until the situation changes
in El Salvador, without being subjected to the burden of proof of a rea-
sonable fear of persecution. 1 Although State Department recommenda-
tions are not binding on the INS, all blanket grants of voluntary depar-
ture made in recent years have been based on State Department
recommendations .
62
A State Department letter in response to Senator Kennedy's letter il-
lustrates the type of factors that enter into the State Department's as-
sessment of a potential refugee situation." The State Department noted
that both the Refugee Protocol and the Refugee Act place upon the asy-
lum-seeker the burden of showing a well-founded fear of persecution.
While the State Department deplored the level of violence in El Salvador,
it concluded that the "wide-spread fighting, destruction and breakdown
of public services"' 4 had not reached the condition it had in Nicaragua,
Lebanon or Uganda when blanket voluntary departure had been recom-
mended for nationals of those countries. The letter contended that
Salvadorans illegally in the United States "who were not involved in po-
litical or military activities before their departure, would not face, upon
voluntary departure include Ethiopians (from May 1977 to November 1981); Ugandans
(April 1978 to the present); Iranians (April 1979 until November 1980) and Nicaraguans
(June 1979 to September 1980). Letter from David Crosland, Acting INS Comm'r, to Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy (May 1, 1981), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S831 (daily ed. Feb. 11,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Crosland-Kennedy letter]; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at A4,
col. 1 (Chicago ed.). Blanket voluntary departure was granted to Polish nationals on De-
cember 13, 1981, until at least March 31, 1982, at which time the INS planned to reevalu-
ate the state of martial rule in Poland. The Plain Dealer, March 19, 1982, at 14-A, col. 1.
This policy was later extended until December 31, 1982. On December 18, 1982, the State
Department sent a letter to the Attorney General requesting that a further six-month exten-
sion be authorized. The letter noted that Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee supported the extension and cited an estimate that 200,000
Poles were permitted to remain in Western Europe after the imposition of martial law in
Poland. "It may be at least six months before the United States and other western countries
will be able to ascertain whether the Polish government is truly prepared to allow the Polish
people the exercise of their human rights." 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 20 (1983). On Decem-
ber 20, 1982, the INS central office officially notified all INS offices of an extension in
deferred departure until June 30, 1983. Id.
From January 15 to April 15, 1981, in response to particularly intense fighting in El Sal-
vador, the State Department requested the INS to suspend action on Salvadoran asylum
requests; however, this decision was of limited scope since only a small percentage of
Salvadorans facing expulsion had applied for asylum at the time. Report of Comm'r, 128
CONG. REC. at S829 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982); letter from Alvin Paul Drischler, Acting Ass't
Sec. for Cong. Relations, to Senator Edward Kennedy (April 17, 1981), reprinted in 128
CONG. REC. S831 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Drischler-Kennedy letter].
61 A special inquiry officer may, "in his discretion," authorize suspension of deportation
or voluntary departure "under such conditions as the district director shall direct." 8 C.F.R.
§ 244.1 (1982).
6 Crosland-Kennedy letter, supra note 60.
13 Drischler-Kennedy letter, supra note 60.
64 Id.
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return, any more danger than is faced by their compatriots who never
left. .. ."" The letter concluded that Salvadorans do not flee "solely to
seek haven in this country,""6 which it seemed to hold determinative on
the issue of whether they could meet the refugee definition. Considering
the fact that the Reagan Administration was at the time seeking congres-
sional approval for military assistance to the government of El Salvador
by showing a fair record on human rights, it would be unrealistic to think
that this Administration policy did not color the State Department's
views.
Although the UNHCR uses the same definition of refugee as the
United States government does, its refugee determinations do not bear
the same link to national foreign policy interests as do those of a sover-
eign state. Perhaps for this reason, the UNHCR mission that investigated
the conditions of Salvadorans in the United States in September 1981
reached different conclusions about the nature of the Salvadoran exodus.
The mission found that the flow of Salvadorans to the United States
bears a "direct causal relationship with the internal strife in El Salva-
dor. 16 7 Noting that the return of Salvadoran refugees, either by deporta-
' Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
17 Report of Comm'r, 128 CONG. REC. at S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982). In late 1981 the
Senate and House discussed the status of Salvadoran refugees as part of their consideration
of amendments to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat 1519 (codified as amended in titles 5, 5 app., 7, 8, 10, & 22
U.S.C. (1982)). The House amendment recommended a blanket grant of extended voluntary
departure to Salvadorans who requested such a stay. The Senate bill contained no such
provision. 127 CONG. REc. H9642 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1981). The Conference Committee rec-
ommended a compromise which was approved as § 731 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981.
It is the sense of the Congress that the administration should continue to review,
on a case-by-case basis, petitions for voluntary extended departure made by citi-
zens of El Salvador who claim that they are subject to persecution in their home-
land, and should take full account of the civil strife in El Salvador in making
decisions on such petitions.
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, § 731, 8 U.S.C. § 1157
note (1982). The INS has specific authority to grant voluntary departure "on account of
civil war or catastrophic circumstances" under its internal operations instructions. INS OP-
ERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 242.10(f)(3) (1981). This congressional recommendation resem-
bles a State Department recommendation to the INS made in 1976 with regard to Lebanese
nationals at the height of the civil war in that country. See Crosland-Kennedy letter, supra
note 60.
As the legislative branch sought ways of contributing to the debate on the application of
the theory of refugee rights to a pressing human drama, an equally significant weighing
process was occurring between the INS and the judiciary.
Several class action suits which were filed in the Southwest by Salvadorans resulted in
injunctions against the INS for failure to observe obligations undertaken by the United
States pursuant to the United Nations Protocol, which were codified in the 1980 Refugee
Act. See Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith,
541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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tion or by voluntary departure without advice of the right to apply for
asylum, and the wholesale denial of asylum applications appeared to be
the result of "deliberate policy established by U.S. authorities in Wash-
ington," the mission concluded that these practices "would appear to rep-
resent a negation of. . .United States. . .responsibilities assumed upon
its adherence to the Protocol." 8
The contrast between these two views-that of the State Department
and that of a United Nations agency-raises the underlying issue: how is
one to assess individual motives for flight and fear of return in the con-
text of mass migration?
C. Refugee Motives
The distinction between those who flee persecution and those who flee
poverty is clearly articulated by Norwegian scholar Atle Grahl-Madsen.
A person who leaves his home country for economic reasons may
properly be called an "economic migrant" or a "migrant for em-
ployment" . . . The fact that in many democratic countries eco-
nomic conditions are better and the standard of living higher
than in many countries under dictatorship has given rise to the
term "economic refugee" .. This is, however, a misnomer and
should be avoided.
The qualities of "economic migrant" and "political refugee" do
not mutually exclude each other, but an "economic migrant" who
is also a "political refugee" is not an "ordinary migrant" .. . .
The difference between the "ordinary migrant" and the "politi-
cal refugee" is that whereas the former is capable of having a
normal relationship with the authorities of his home country,
the latter is not.e9
This theoretically clear distinction between political refugees and eco-
nomic migrants becomes clouded when one attempts to translate it into
reality. Motives for migration are inevitably a mix of economic, social and
political considerations all bound together by an existential decision to
abandon one life and to seek a new one elsewhere. This is certainly true
of immigrants who come directly to the United States under the present
preference system based on family reunification and national economic
development policy. And it is no less true of those who flee en masse and
without documents.
One legal issue that has arisen in this context is whether an asylum
policy should distinguish between those who flee to escape persecution
and those whose fear of return is based on the desire to avoid persecution.
This was especially important under the now-repealed seventh preference
88 Report of Comm'r, 128 CONG. REc. at S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982).
6 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 47, at 75-76 (emphasis added).
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category which included flight as an element of refugee eligibility.70 A se-
ries of administrative and court decisions addressed the issue of flight in
the context of the distinction between persecution and legitimate prose-
cution for illegal departure. Several views emerged. The restrictive view
looks to the individual's motives at the time of flight as determinative.
This appears to be the State Department approach to Salvadoran refu-
gees. Another view looks to the motives for seeking asylum. The most
liberal view ignores the motives of the individual asylum seeker and ex-
amines the general practice of the refugee's home state in inflicting
penalties.
In In re Janus & Janek,7 1 a 1968 case involving an application for the
withholding of deportation to Czechoslovakia, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) enunciated the restrictive test:
A person whose departure from an Iron Curtain country is devoid
of political motivation, or whose decision not to return is unre-
lated to the politics of that country (e.g., the person who finds
better economic opportunity here, or enters into a marital rela-
tionship with a resident alien or United States citizen) is not enti-
tled to a section 243(h) stay solely on the basis that he may face
criminal prosecution for overstay.72
Although the BIA acknowledged that the prior expression of political
opposition is not mandatory to prove politically motivated flight and con-
ceded that the withholding of deportation should not be limited to "per-
sons who climbed under fences or swam rivers at night, ' 73 its decision
rests on the idea that the dispositive issue in granting or denying asylum
is the individual's motive for fleeing. Janus & Janek appears to hold that
unless an individual's departure is political, he cannot be considered a
refugee even if the treatment he will face upon return home would consti-
tute persecution. Beyond that harsh dictum lies the presumption that
motives are cognizable. It is not coincidental that Janus & Janek was
decided at a time when there were relatively few requests for asylum. 74
Recent events have highlighted the problem of comprehending such mo-
tives and judicial opinions on the subject appear to be changing. For ex-
ample, in 1977, in Coriolan v. I.N.S.,7 5 the Fifth Circuit considered a case
involving the withholding of deportation of two Haitians. The court re-
viewed the distinction between persecution for the crime of illegal depar-
" INA, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (repealed 1980).
" 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
7" Id. at 876.
7 Id.
71 In 1971, for example, there were only 440 asylum requests. See Cohodas, supra note 44,
at 2069.
75 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
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ture and prosecution and impliedly rejected the Janus & Janek test."
Noting that "[iut is not political persecution, for instance, to punish for
violation of a fairly administered passport law,"77 the Coriolan court
chose, nonetheless, to focus on the state's response and the individual's
motives. "The motive test, after all, does not test whether the govern-
ment's motive for persecution is political. '7 8 Despite this skepticism, the
Coriolan court decided the case on other grounds and suggested that the
motive test may be a "useful device for distinguishing more probable
claims from less. .... 7.
Not surprisingly, the case which appears to have gone farthest in re-
jecting an inquiry into motive for flight in an asylum claim was a class
action suit on behalf of several thousand people, Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti,80 where the district court posed the question: how would
these plaintiffs be treated if returned to Haiti?81 Although the court did
not expressly overrule Janus & Janek, it did engage in a fundamentally
different form of inquiry. Upon finding that returnees would be subjected
to various forms of reprisals and oppression, the court simply presumed
political flight. In what appeared to be a change in the standard approach
of placing the burden on the applicant, Haitian Refugee Center shifted
the burden to the government: "Until INS can definitely state which Hai-
tians will be [subject to reprisals upon deportation] and which will not,
the brutality and bloodletting is its responsibility."8 2 On appeal, this un-
usually emotional judicial language was decisively rejected by the Fifth
Circuit as "harmful dictum." 83 It might be argued, however, that the dis-
76 Id. at 1000. See Note, Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Closer
Look at Immigration Law and the Political Refugee, 6 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COMM. 133
(1978).
7 559 F.2d at 1000.
78 Id.
79 Id. The Coriolan court cites two other Fifth Circuit cases to demonstrate how the
court's thinking evolved over a short time. In Paul v. I.N.S., 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975),
the court explicitly adopted the two-pronged test which examined the motive for flight and
the state's response, used in Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968). Two years later in
Henry v. I.N.S., 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977), the court ignored the motive for flight
completely.
80 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center
v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
81 503 F. Supp. at 475.
82 Id. at 510.
676 F.2d at 1042. The appeals court remarked that the district court had not been
asked to determine the merits of the asylum claims, but only whether the INS had violated
due process and equal protection in administering the accelerated processing of asylum ap-
plications in the Haitian Program of 1978. The threshold test for the validity of the Haitian
asylum claims did not require such a sweeping appraisal of conditions in Haiti, but only a
determination of whether the Haitians had more than a frivolous claim. The Fifth Circuit
also stressed that INS procedures "clearly place the burden of proof on the asylum appli-
cant." Id.
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trict court's finding did not represent a final shift in the burden of proof,
but only a shift to the INS to rebut evidence that Haiti today is charac-
terized by an endemic state of persecution so that many if not all who
return would experience a well-founded fear of persecution. This type of
presumption is standard procedure in the granting of refugee status to
members of groups targeted for refugee benefits.
Despite some judicial reluctance to focus on motive for departure, the
State Department generally addresses this issue in its country profiles
which form the basis for policy decisions in cases of substantial popula-
tion movement.8 4 And since State Department advisory opinions are man-
dated in hearings on asylum and withholding of deportation, the issue of
motivation cannot be overlooked.
One approach to intent or motive in a context of mass flight may be
derived by analogy to individual cases. Where a person has actually been
penalized for political views, or nationality, or any of the recognized
grounds for a finding of persecution, both the BIA and the courts have
presumed politically motivated flight and found a reasonably grounded
fear of persecution upon return.8 5 But when the asylum applicant has not
suffered individual persecution, the courts have been less willing to make
such a presumption.8 As the BIA stated in Janus & Janek:s7 "[W]e have
not regarded with favor an applicant whose first indication of opposition
to the political regime of the country he left is made after arrival in the
United States."8 8
"' See Drischler-Kennedy letter, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
15 In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968) (expression of opposition resulted in
dismissal from school); Kovac v. I.N.S., 407 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1969) (job discrimination
after refusal to become informer).
"' This has been particularly striking in the handling of claims that a well-founded fear of
persecution derives from actual persecution of relatives. See In re Francois, 15 I. & N. Dec.
534 (1975) (allegations by Haitian that father and other family members were murdered for
political reasons not sufficient for withholding of deportation under § 243(h)); Hyppolite v.
I.N.S., 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967) (allegations that father was murdered and concern that
police searching for applicant in Haiti not sufficient for § 243(h) relief).
17 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
88 Id. at 872. This was the primary assumption in In re Taheri, 14 I. & N. Dec. 27
(1972), where an Iranian student from a well-to-do family came to the United States with a
valid student visa and subsequently joined the Confederation of Iranian Students. After the
Confederation was banned by the Shah, Taheri applied for asylum, but the INS denied the
application, focusing on the applicant's nonpolitical reasons for initially leaving Iran. After
an appeal and remand with instructions to consider the significance of the ban of the Stu-
dent Confederation, the INS again denied the relief on the grounds that students have an
obligation to return home and should not be encouraged to repudiate that duty because of
the ease with which they could get involved in political activity in the United States. Id.
app. at 40 (In re Behroozi & Taheri, July 10, 1973). A State Department letter was cited as
persuasive by the INS. Id. app. at 36 (In re Behroozi & Taheri, July 10, 1973). The BIA has
ruled otherwise on occasion, however. In In re Zedkova, the BIA held that a temporary
departure by an individual with no past history of political activity plus a change in govern-
ment (here the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) constituted a "constructive flight" suffi-
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The reason for such suspicion is that a person seeking refugee status is
held to a standard of good faith. Grahl-Madsen describes the rule apply-
ing to signatories of the Refugee Convention as follows:
[W]e may have to draw a distinction among . . . those who un-
wittingly or unwillingly have committed a politically pertinent
act, and those who have done it for the sole purpose of getting a
pretext for claiming refugeehood. The former may claim good
faith, the latter may not. The principle of good faith implies that
a Contracting State cannot be bound to grant refugee status to a
person who is not a bona fide refugee.8 9
In cases of mass flight, very few refuge-seekers are active members of a
political opposition, although they may represent religious or ethnic mi-
norities. Perhaps their chief motive is the unconscious "propensity to mi-
grate" that has existed throughout human history.90 But it would be in-
correct to suggest that flight under these circumstances is a pretext for
claiming refugeehood. The problem is to determine whether the act of
flight is legally relevant to the later political persecution. If so, it is
proper to read political motive into an unwitting act. This would conform
to the general rule that "the behavior of the persecutors is decisive with
respect to which persons shall be considered refugees."9
In countries with undemocratic political regimes, the expression of a
dissident opinion may be quite dangerous.92 ' This fact is clearly recog-
nized in Congress's decision to augment the United Nations Convention's
refugee definition and include persons detained arbitrarily in their own
countries. But refugee status is not restricted to martyrs. If an individual
can demonstrate that flight was a manifestation of an opinion that would
have resulted in persecution if expressed, should he be denied asylum if
persecution would ensue upon deportation? The problem with answering
in the negative is that this would mean that all but the oligarchs in such a
country are potential refugees. While this conclusion may actually de-
cient to make the applicant eligible for refugee status under § 203(a)(7). 13 I. & N. Dec.
626, 628 (1970). Despite the apparent judicial inconsistency, there appears to be an underly-
ing political coherence at work here. Members of the BIA are not immune to the presump-
tions of current American foreign policy.
8 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 47, at 252.
90 Davis, The Migrations of Human Populations, Sci. AM. Sept. 1974, at 92-93. Davis
theorizes that technological inequality has been the engine of human migration throughout
history. It might be noted that one characteristic that unites the vast bulk of ordinary immi-
grants, refugees and asylum claimants is that they come from socioeconomic systems in
which the standard of living is considerably lower than that of the United States.
9' 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 47, at 251-52.
" In Coriolan, the court stated that the immigration judge made a dubious assumption
that because a Haitian does not belong to a political organization and has opinions that do
not differ from those of the majority of the populace, he may not have a valid fear of perse-
cution. 559 F.2d 993, 1000-01.
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scribe American refugee policy toward communism, it is now being put to
the test by people fleeing rightist dictatorships."
D. Economic Motives
Most problematic in this regard is the claim that persecution takes the
form of mass poverty imposed as a means of political control and enrich-
ment of the ruling elite. Poverty alone does not constitute persecution,
but there are forms of economic deprivation that have been held tanta-
mount to persecution. In Daunt v. Hurney,94 the Third Circuit discussed
economic proscription:
Economic sanctions that may tend to lead to social ostracism, or
deny one an opportunity to obtain and enjoy some of the social
niceties and physical comforts certainly [do not constitute physi-
cal persecution. But] . . . [t]he denial of an opportunity to earn a
livelihood . . . is the equivalent of a sentence to death by means
of slow starvation and none the less final because it is gradual.9
Here, the emphasis is on economic hardship imposed by the state against
one individual, 6 but by analogy one may consider an entire class of peo-
ple as persecuted if, for example, their standard of living is sufficiently
low and the rate of infant mortality sufficiently high and this can be at-
tributed to policies that treat political opposition as political dissent.
Under such an analysis, economic refugees would not be distinguished so
much from political refugees as from economic migrants.
Until quite recently, American foreign policy had been premised on the
East-West struggle as the prime issue in the world today. This has begun
to change, and national refugee policy will undoubtedly become increas-
ingly sensitive to North-South issues as the effects of the "propensity to
migrate" become more pronounced. There is general agreement that the
United States cannot accommodate all the refugees in the world. But it is
also obvious that refugees within walking and boating distance of Ameri-
can borders present a special case. The mass influx from the Caribbean
and Central American areas over the past few years has shown this
'3 For a discussion of Haiti's compliance with its own constitution, see Tompkin, A Crim-
inal at the Gate: A Case for the Haitian Refugee, 7 BLACK L.J. 387, 392-96 (1982).
" 297 F.2d 744 (3rd Cir. 1961).
15 Id. at 746.
" 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 47, at 208-09. The author summarizes the distinction be-
tween cases of economic hardship that may be considered persecution and those that may
not. In the former category are complete economic proscription, systematic denial of em-
ployment, denial of all work commensurate with training and denial of a reasonable wage.
Insufficient to show persecution are economic disadvantage resulting from reduced pay, de-
nial of promotion, assignment to undesirable work, expropriation of property as part of a
general policy and measures to apportion resources in short supply. Id. If poverty alone were
enough to warrant refugee status, most of the world would be eligible.
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starkly. When the INS and the State Department attempted to apply the
principles of individual burden of proof in a mass context, they could not
do so without overstepping either the bounds of due process guaranteed
in administrative regulations or the rights guaranteed by the Refugee
Protocol. Not only may it be theoretically impossible to determine mo-
tives in a mass migration, it may be practically impossible as well.
One of the main reasons given for not expanding the refugee definition
to encompass others besides political persecutees is that this would open
the floodgates to the kind of economic migrants that our immigration sys-
tem has sought to exclude. The Brandt Commission on International De-
velopment Issues (1980) takes a different view, concluding that "[riefugee
problems are not caused by population pressure. Their roots lie in intoler-
ance, political instability and war."9 7 A refugee definition based strictly
on persecution spoke to the ideology-charged atmosphere of World
War II and its aftermath. It may be that the realities of the 1980's will
yield a new approach to both the definition of refugee and to the choice
of beneficiaries of American refugee policies. Current talk of a "Marshall
Plan for the Caribbean" may be evidence that a kind of political re-
orientation is occurring. Just as the Marshall Plan brought stability to
Europe to stem the flow of refugees, such an aid plan for the Americas
would seem to be the most effective long-range method of response to the
human flood that has challenged United States refugee policy.98
97 INDEP. COMM'N ON INT'L DEV. ISSUES UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF WILLY BRANDT,
NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL 113 (1980).
'8 Such a plan would represent both continuity and change in United States refugee pol-
icy. Like the plan for the rehabilitation of Europe after World War II, it is aimed at incul-
cating democratic values and preventing a takeover by forces sympathetic to Communist
ideas or what today is called "Marxist-Leninist dictatorship." Further, it recognizes that
massive population dislocation causes political unrest. But in the case of Central America,
United States foreign and refugee policy has a more direct interest in stemming the tide of
refugees who do not knock first but simply enter. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on March 25, 1982, Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. dis-
cussed the Reagan Administration's Caribbean aid plan in a way that knit together the two
factors that have consistently stood behind United States refugee policy-humanitarian in-
terests and realpolitik. The plan would serve United States interests, Stoessel stated, by
"alleviating the root causes of human misery which have stimulated a major and sustained
flow of people from the Caribbean basin into the United States." N.Y. Times, Mar. 26,
1982, at A6, col. 6 (late city ed.).
The Senate did not take up the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative before ad-
journment on December 23, 1982. Among the reasons for the failure to develop a coherent
United States policy on this issue was the conflict between sectional and parochial interests
within the United States and the general national interest in stemming the refugee tide.
Thus one House of Representatives bill, H.R. 7397, which would have provided the duty
free entry into the United States of goods manufactured in the Caribbean, met with stern
resistance from sectors of the United States economy that benefited from tariffs on Carib-
bean products.
On December 22, 1982, President Reagan vowed to press for passage in 1983 of an inte-
grated development/refugee plan for the region. See generally, Murray, Caribbean Trade
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IV. LEGAL AVENUES FOR ASSERTING ASYLUM CLAIMS
The foregoing discussion has centered on the underlying concept of ref-
ugee as a person incapable of maintaining a normal relationship with his
country of origin. Beyond this general connotation, the term refugee has a
specific meaning in United States law. A refugee is one who obtains spe-
cial immigration benefits because of his status while outside this country.
This type of refugee may be contrasted to the asylee who is already in
the United States when special benefits are accorded.
Within the broader field of refugee law, asylum is "the protection
which a State grants on its territory . . . to a person who comes to seek
it."99 Over the years a variety of procedures have developed in the United
States, whereby a person present here could ask to remain in order to
avoid persecution in his own country. These include a stay of deportation
under section 243(h) of the INA, a grant of asylum (from 1974 until 1980
under INS regulations and now, under section 208 of the INA) and other
provisions that may be viewed as adjuncts to overall refugee policy. 00
A. Withholding of Deportation-INA Section 243(h)
The right to have deportation withheld for fear of persecution dates
back to 1950 when the then-current Immigration Act of 1917 was
amended to require the Attorney General to withhold deportation to any
country upon a finding that the alien would suffer physical persecution
there.10 1 Congress retained this provision in the INA of 1952 as sec-
tion 243(h) but changed the requirement to discretionary authority and
relieved the Attorney General of the need to make a finding on the issue
of persecution; instead he was to render an opinion.0 ' These provisions
generated numerous lawsuits concerning the nature of the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion1 0 3 and the interpretation of "physical persecution.' 0 4
Plan Dies in the Senate, 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 3095.
" This definition was adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1950. 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 15 (Supp. 1951).
oo Extended voluntary departure has already been discussed. See supra notes 60-68. The
INA permitted up to one-half of all seventh preference numbers to be applied to eligible
refugees from Communist or Middle East countries who were physically present in the
United States. INA, § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C § 1153(a)(7) (1976) (repealed 1980). In addition,
parole under § 212(d)(5) was a discretionary means of affording asylum to various catego-
ries of persons, such as alien crewmen alleging persecution who seek relief under 8 C.F.R.
§ 253.1(f) (1983).
10' Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
102 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Stays of De-
portation: Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 59.
103 Compare United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953)
(the court may not substitute its judgment for the Attorney General's), with Sovich v. Es-
perdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963) (Attorney General's standard of discretion subject to judi-
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The 1965 amendments to the INA, which brought about a number of
significant liberalizations, replaced the "physical persecution" standard
with a different yardstick-"persecution on account of race, religion or
political opinion."' ° From a policy point of view, this change reflected
both a modified perception of the nature of Soviet methods of political
control in the post-Stalin era and a desire to lighten the burden of proof
on the asylum applicant. 10 6 The 1965 amendment did not alter the Attor-
ney General's power to enforce or withhold deportation in his discretion
upon a showing that return to a country of origin would result in
persecution.
With the accession of the United States to the Refugee Protocol in
1968, persons subject to deportation obtained another avenue of relief
upon a showing of a well-founded fear of persecution. Article 33 of the
United Nations Convention, which was incorporated in the Protocol,
states: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,




The linguistic discrepancy between the discretionary nature of sec-
tion 243(h) of the INA and the mandatory injunction against expulsion
in article 33 provoked questions as to which standard would apply. In In
re Dunar, the Board of Immigration Appeals undertook an extensive re-
view of this issue and concluded that article 33 "effected no substantial
changes in the application of 243(h), either by way of burden of proof,
coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions,"' 10 8 basing this conclusion
largely on presidential documents and testimony given at Senate hearings
to the effect that the Protocol conferred no new rigbts on aliens. The BIA
noted, however, that in no case known to it "was a denial of relief sus-
tained as a valid exercise of discretion in the face of a finding that the
alien would probably be persecuted.' 0 9
cial review).
'04 Compare Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961) (physical persecution
means confinement, torture or death), with Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1961)
(denial of opportunity to earn a living may be physical persecution).
105 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)).
'06 Congressman Feighan, Chairman of the House Committee that proposed the amend-
ment, stated on the House floor in support of the change that "[t]yranny over the mind and
spirit of a person has been demonstrated as more fearsome than the ancient methods of
torture which characterized the Communist takeover of many countries of Central and East
Europe." 111 CONG. REc. 21,584, 21,586 (1965).
107 Refugee Protocol, supra note 30, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6276. In his transmittal letter to the
Senate, President Johnson spoke of this provision as "[floremost among the humanitarian
rights which the Protocol provides." PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 868-69 (1968).
14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 323 (1973).
'0' Id. The BIA argued that because the "humanitarian values" in § 243(h) distinguish
1983-84]
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The prevailing rule at the time is stated in Kasravi v. I.N.S.," 0 where it
was held that the INS as a delegatee of the Attorney General retained
"broad discretion" to determine section 243(h) eligibility and that judi-
cial review of this administrative decision was to be based on the lowest
level of scrutiny available."' Kasravi, an Iranian, claimed he would be
persecuted if deported to Iran and argued that the immigration judge had
abused his discretion in not finding the plaintiff's claim within the ambit
of the statute. The court disagreed with Kasravi's premise:
By finding that the petitioner is not "statutory eligible" for relief
it might appear that the special inquiry officer was making a
finding of fact based upon an evaluation of the record before him.
If such a finding of fact were required by the statute, the decision
of the Attorney General would be subject to review in order to
determine whether such finding were supported by reasonable,
substantial and probative evidence. . . .However, Congress has
made it abundantly clear by the express wording of the statute
that no such finding is contemplated or required. It left to the
broad discretion of the Attorney General the authority to suspend
deportation in such cases and the questions of both eligibility and
merit (if there be a difference) are part and parcel of this admin-
istrative determination.12
As part of the general effort to bring United States refugee law into
conformity with the Refugee Convention, Congress in 1980 amended sec-
tion 243(h) to read: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return"
any alien who proves to be a refugee under the Act."' As must have been
expected, this change resurrected the challenge to the discrepancy be-
tween section 243(h) and article 33 that the BIA thought it had put to
rest in Dunar.
1. The McMullen Case
In McMullen v. I.N.S.,"" an ex-member of the provisional wing of the
Irish Republican Army claimed that he would be persecuted by his for-
mer comrades for his apostacy if deported to Ireland. The immigration
judge was persuaded by McMullen's case, but the BIA reversed on the
that section from other provisions for discretionary relief such as § 244 (suspension of de-
portation and voluntary departure), § 245 (adjustment of status) and § 249 (waiver of
grounds for inadmissibility), the latter provisions require first a decision as to eligibility and
then an exercise of discretion, while § 243(h) permits discretion only as to the likelihood of
persecution. Id. at 322-23.
"0 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 677.
Id. (emphasis added).
M INA, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
'1 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). See In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542 (1980).
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grounds that the immigration judge had erred in interpreting the evi-
dence that the Irish government would not be able to control McMullen's
potential persecutors. In responding to the appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
the INS acknowledged that the new wording of section 243(h) eliminates
its discretion to withhold deportation if persecution is found to be likely,
but, relying on Dunar, contended that it retained discretion to determine
whether or not persecution is likely. McMullen argued that the "shall not
deport" language deprived the INS of discretion on both counts. The
court agreed with the asylum seeker and implicitly overruled Dunar,
stating:
A factual determination is now required, and the board must
withhold deportation if certain facts exist. This change requires
judicial review of the Board's factual findings if the 1980 amend-
ment . . . is to be given full effect. Agency findings arising from
public, record producing proceedings are normally subject to the
substantial evidence standard of review. '
The key to this change is that the agency must make a finding of fact
as to whether the alien will suffer persecution if deported. The issues that
now must be resolved are: first, what is the burden of proof and what
evidence is needed to sustain this burden; and second, what is the stan-
dard of review by the court.
It is a basic tenet of United States immigration law that an individual
seeking a benefit bears the burden of proof in establishing eligibility.'
"' 658 F.2d at 1316. Since Congress stated that its intent in rewording § 243(h) was to
bring the terminology of United States law into line with the Refugee Convention, one may
question whether Dunar was a valid interpretation of previous law. At the time, the United
States had already acceded to the Refugee Protocol and its binding obligations.
"I See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982) (burden of proof on alien to prove general eligibility for
immigration benefits); 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1983) (burden of proof upon asylum applicant to
show that he/she meets the refugee definition and other terms of asylum eligibility); id.
§ 242.17 (in application for withholding deportation "respondent has the burden of satisfy-
ing" the special inquiry officer that he will be persecuted upon deportation). But see id.
§ 207.1 (applicants for refugee status may apply at overseas INS office if they believe they
fall within one of the groups of "special humanitarian concern" designated by the Presi-
dent); id. § 207.3 (burden of proof explicitly stated not in terms of proof of persecution but
in terms of proof that a waiver of denial of eligibility should be granted for "humanitarian
purposes, to assure family unity, or in the public interest.").
The standard of proof required inspired some disagreement. The Refugee Act speaks of
"well-founded fear" of persecution. INA, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982). In the
past, the burden of proof "beyond a troubling doubt" has been held to be too onerous. Paul
v. I.N.S., 521 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1975). However, In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 318-
19 (1973), held that "clear probability of persecution" did not differ meaningfully from
"well-founded fear" in that both require an objective test.
Recent cases have discussed the burden of proof in different ways. See McMullen v.
I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981) (burden to prove probable persecution); Almirol
v. I.N.S., 550 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (INS failure to inquire into reasonableness
of fear of persecution and exclusive emphasis on actuality of persecution ruled improper);
1983-841
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But proof of what might or might not occur in the future is at best specu-
lative. The applicant for refugee status can scarcely be expected to mar-
shal a case with evidence and witnesses if he has fled, often with little
more than his clothing. In many cases, particularly when application for
refugee status is made at overseas offices of the INS, proof of eligibility
requires little more than an appearance before an immigration official to
answer a few questions and establish non-excludability. The INS, follow-
ing the lead of the State Department, has in effect taken notice that con-
ditions in a particular country are such that the asylum-seeker need only
prove that he falls within a certain group.11 7 The applicant has had his
personal case proved for him. Generally the countries that fall into this
category are those that have been foreign policy adversaries of the United
States. In other cases, the burden of proof on the individual is more oner-
ous, since he must show that there is a persecutor and that he is a poten-
tial target. This is most difficult if he comes from a country that United
States foreign policy does not presume to be hostile to its own citizenry.
a. The Role of the State Department
As the agency charged with the making of foreign policy, the State De-
partment is given an important role in the determination of asylum and
the withholding of deportation claims. In both cases the INS must re-
quest an advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs (BHRHA) in the Department of State."" As noted
earlier in the case of decisions to grant blanket voluntary departure sta-
tus, State Department recommendations are persuasive to the INS." 9
Concerning judicial review, in an early test of section 243(h), the Sec-
Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 1982) (to merit asylum 1980 Refugee Act requires
"well-founded fear" of persecution, a standard falling far short of "clear probability");
Rejaie v. I.N.S., 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982) (expressly rejecting the Stevic court's stat-
utory history, concluding that "well-founded fear" standard same as "clear probability").
On February 28, 1983, the Supreme Court granted the government petition for certiorari
to review Stevic in Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -,
103 S.Ct. 1249 (1983). For a detailed look at the issue and more cases see Steinberg, The
Standard of Proof in Asylum Cases, IMMIGRATION J., Autumn 1982, at 8.
"' The author has had numerous conversations with refugees from the USSR and East-
ern Europe who attest to the pro forma nature of interviews conducted by INS officers at
the United States consulate in Rome.
"I The INS district director must request an advisory opinion in all cases. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.7 (1983). The immigration judge is obliged to request a BHRHA opinion if the appli-
cant has not previously applied to the district director. Id. § 208.10. If an asylum applica-
tion has already been made and an opinion received, the immigration judge is not to request
a second letter unless, in his discretion, he finds that circumstances have changed since the
receipt of the first opinion. Under INS Operations Instructions No. 242.17(c), the proce-
dures to be followed in determining a § 243(h) claim are to follow those used in asylum
applications. Presumably they would be based on the procedures followed by the immigra-
tion judge.
"I See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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ond Circuit justified limiting judicial review of a deportation order on the
grounds that "the very nature of the decision . . . the (Attorney General)
. . .must make concerning what the foreign country is likely to do is a
political issue into which the courts should not intrude."'"2 As long as the
wording of section 243(h) granted discretionary power to the Attorney
General, courts concluded that they were barred from reviewing findings
of fact because none were required. Nonetheless, the courts did address
the issue of the reliability and value of State Department opinions. In
particular, the Ninth Circuit has issued several decisions on the topic and
has noted the inherent problems, both procedural and substantive, in us-
ing opinions based on area profiles to determine whether a particular in-
dividual will suffer persecution. In Kasravi,'21 the Ninth Circuit noted:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guaran-
tees of reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence.
A frank, but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a
friendly nation is not always compatible with the high duty to
maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with nations through-
out the world. The traditional foundation required of expert testi-
mony is lacking; nor can official position be said to supply an ac-
ceptable substitute. No hearing officer or court has the means to
know the diplomatic necessities of the moment, in the light of
which the statements must be weighed. 22
120 United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1953).
This "political question" doctrine rests on an idea expounded in the aftermath of the
Mexican Revolution in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("[t]he con-
duct of foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Execu-
tive and the Legislative-the 'political'-Departments of the government; and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision."). In that case, the Court held that the political question doctrine was not based
on lack of jurisdiction but rather on a fear of embarrassing the government and jeopardizing
peaceful relations.
A more flexible approach was urged by an activist court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). This case concerned legislative control over apportionment but included strong dic-
tum about foreign policy. The Court noted:
It is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign rela-
tions lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to
show a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the
history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial
handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the
possible judicial consequences of judicial action.
Id. at 211-12.
"' Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
121 Id. at 677 n.1. See Paul v. I.N.S., 521 F.2d 194, 205 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dis-
senting) (questioning the presumption that the State Department is always reliable; noting
that a State Department telegram, upon which an immigration judge relied and which the
BIA stated came from a "reliable, knowledgeable and competent source," was ultimately
shown to be wrong and uninformed); Khalil v. District Director, 457 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.
1972); Hosseinmardi v. I.N.S., 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1969).
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This reasoning does not fault the State Department for practicing diplo-
macy. Rather it questions the relevance and weight of a statement based
on diplomatic exigencies in an individual asylum case. The State Depart-
ment functions at the level of state-to-state relations, while an asylum
claim necessarily pits the individual against the state.
Arguments for the value of State Department materials stress the De-
partment's expertise and access to information. In In re Francois'23 for
example, the BIA ruled that an immigration judge had erred in excluding
from evidence in a section 243(h) proceeding the State Department cor-
respondence used in an earlier asylum claim. The Board noted that "the
Department of State may have access to information regarding the condi-
tions in a foreign country which may not be available from any other
source."1
24
The most extensive review to date of State Department materials oc-
curred in Haitian Refugee Center.'25 Called on to determine whether asy-
lum applicants had been denied due process, the court considered
whether the political question doctrine prevented it from making inde-
pendent findings of fact on conditions in Haiti. 26 After rebuffing a State
12 15 I. & N. Dec. 534 (1975).
2I Id. at 536. While the State Department's access to information may make it a valuable
resource in asylum determinations, the applicant may not in all cases be allowed to see that
information. Regulations provide that whenever a BHRHA opinion is used in a decision it is
to be included in the record and the applicant is to have a right to inspect, explain or rebut
the evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1982). If the material is sensitive, however, the State
Department may classify it under Exec. Order No. 12065, in which case the applicant is
denied access to it. 3 C.F.R. § 190 (1978). In a withholding of deportation proceeding, when
classified information is received from the State Department, the applicant is entitled only
to know whether it concerns general conditions in a foreign country or the applicant person-
ally. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c).
121 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd and modi-
fied sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
21 503 F. Supp. at 470-73. The plaintiffs contended that the State Department improp-
erly permitted foreign policy considerations to influence its review of asylum applications.
The State Department acknowledged that a court could inquire into the means by which
the Department adhered to procedures, regulations and laws to which it is bound, but ar-
gued that for the court to engage in an inquiry of its own as to conditions in Haiti would be
to subject foreign policy to judicial review.
Although the case was brought on the issue of discriminatory handling of asylum claims,
the court looked first to § 243(h) and the Refugee Protocol to find the underlying legal
principles upon which asylum is granted. Although it reviewed decisions which were discre-
tionary on the part of the INS district director, the court argued it was obliged to conduct a
"limited examination" of the evidence used by the district director. Id. at 473.
In rejecting the State Department's claim that an independent inquiry into Haitian condi-
tions would be a judiciary intrusion, the court referred to the act of state doctrine enunci-
ated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), where the judiciary
announced it would not examine the validity of an act of state by a sovereign government
barring "a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles."
Id. at 428. This holding, which involved Cuba's expropriation of American-owned sugar
companies, prompted Congress to pass the "Sabbatino" Amendment, which requires courts
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Department contention that such an inquiry would be an improper foray
into the political realm, the court subjected State Department materials,
particularly a report on the treatment of deportees to Haiti, to a rigorous
methodological and factual analysis. The court appeared to place greater
faith in findings admitted into evidence of professional investigators such
as Amnesty International and the Lawyers' Committee for International
Human Rights. 27 The court determined that in not granting asylum the
INS showed "profound ignorance, if not an intentional disregard" of con-
ditions in Haiti.'
28
On appeal the INS argued that the review court should not have
reached that conclusion because conditions in Haiti were irrelevant to a
determination of procedural rights during asylum hearings. In Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith the Fifth Circuit adopted a compromise and
held that an examination of Haitian conditions is relevant only to show
"the scope of evidence available" to substantiate applicants' claims, but
not to permit judicial resolution of the underlying asylum claim. 129 Be-
cause of this limitation, the court declined to consider the government's
renewed claim that the district court overstepped its bounds in taking up
foreign policy matters.
Until the 1980 changes in the wording of section 243(h), a decision to
withhold deportation was subject to judicial review on grounds of proce-
dural due process. 30 The question whether the decision was based on
"relevant factors" permitted a limited examination of evidence, but not a
weighing of arguments.1"'
to consider whether an act of expropriation by a foreign state violates international law
unless the executive explicitly asks the court to refrain from such an inquiry.
Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1013 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976)). The amend-
ment was a controlling factor in the decision rendered against the Cubans in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967). In Farr, the court noted that the
amendment effected a "reversal of presumptions" about a court's judgment of an act of
state. Id. at 181. Rather than presume not to inquire, the courts should presume to inquire
precisely because Congress has mandated such an inquiry by passing the amendment.
Although the court in Haitian Refugee Center did not spell out its conclusions com-
pletely, it appears to hold by analogy that the passage of the withholding statute and the
accession to the Refugee Protocol reverse the presumption that the courts are not to inquire
about otherwise political questions that fall within the purview of the statute and Protocol.
Furthermore, because neither the statute nor the Protocol includes a clause empowering the
government to ask the court not to make such an inquiry, the State Department's claim of
judicial intrusion in foreign policy is overridden by the requirements of the statute and the
Protocol.
503 F. Supp. at 482-88.
Id. at 510.
129 676 F.2d 1023, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982).
130 Henry v. I.N.S., 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977).
"' Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 473 n.55 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
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b. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
It was against this background that the McMullen court considered the
1980 Refugee Act."2 Observing that the "charge of the agency [had
changed] from discretion to the imperative," the court ruled that the evi-
dence must be subjected to a different examination altogether."'3 Specifi-
cally, the court focused on the BIA's failure to support its decision by
substantial evidence in light of McMullen's elaborate and lengthy
testimony.
The INS contended that McMullen's evidence as to the general state of
affairs in Ireland was irrelevant, since the petitioner bears the burden of
showing that he personally will suffer persecution. 3 But the INS had
built its own case on general State Department evidence as to the general
situation in Ireland and the contention that McMullen's personal testi-
mony was self-serving. The court held this insufficient. Instead, it shifted
the burden onto the INS to controvert McMullen's personal testimony
and specific evidence about IRA terrorism and reprisals.'36
The test proclaimed by McMullen would place upon the INS the bur-
den of rebutting the asylum claimant's case and then submitting to a
court inquiry as to whether the BIA finding is reasonable. While it may
be quite difficult for a reviewing court to come to more than tentative
conclusions as to the personal testimony of the applicant, such a standard
of review will necessitate consideration of evidence about conditions in a
foreign country. The court did limit its inquiry by saying that it would
not "review the facts de novo," that "deference to agency expertise is still
applicable" and that the review is limited to substantial evidence on the
record."3 " Nevertheless, this standard provides for considerably more in-
volvement by the judiciary than has been practiced in the past.
Commenting on McMullen, Ira Kurzban, a leading attorney in numer-
ous cases including the Haitian Refugee Center class action suits, 37
warned against an overly generous interpretation of McMullen: 38
Unlike McMullen, other asylum applicants may take little sol-
ace from the Ninth Circuit's opinion. McMullen had a good, well-
documented case, but the typical Iranian, Haitian or Salvadoran
who does indeed have a bona fide and well founded fear of perse-
McMullen v. I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
"' Id. at 1319.
"s Id. at 1317. The court stated: "The INS did not submit evidence of its own which
indicated that any of McMullen's exhibits were inaccurate, nor did it submit independent
evidence showing McMullen's lack of credibility." Id.
136 Id.
'" Id. at 1319. This is the standard of review mandated by the landmark case of Univer-
sal Cameron Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
"'7 See supra note 13.
"I8 Kurzban, How the BIA Views the 1980 Refugee Act-Narrowly, IMMIGRATION J.,
Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 13.
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cution will ordinarily have little more than his own testimony and
perhaps some newspaper or magazine articles describing the per-
secution of others like him to back up his own story.'3 9
For practitioners, it may be most important to determine what type of
outside evidence will be given greatest credence by the court. While pop-
ular and journalistic evidence as to conditions in a foreign country may
continue to be viewed with suspicion by the courts, 4 it may be that
materials by professional organizations such as Amnesty International
will be weighed on an equal basis with State Department materials for
their general reliability and method of inquiry in both asylum and sec-
tion 243(h) stay of deportation cases. 4 1
In the history of the interplay among the three branches of government
involving refugee matters, McMullen may mark a turning point. For the
first time a court has sanctioned the weighing of evidence of conditions in
119 Id. at 14. Russell Ezolt, a staff attorney for the Cleveland office of the INS, expressed
the view that INS attorneys had unnecessarily lost McMullen. Ezolt contended that regard-
less of his persecution claim, McMullen should have been deportable because he took part
in the persecution of others while a member of the Provisional IRA, thus making him ineli-
gible for any refugee benefits. Interview with Russell Ezolt (May 26, 1982).
4I See Henry v. I.N.S., 552 F.2d 130, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1977) (unsubstantiated claims not
probative); In re Martinez-Romero, I.N.S. Interim Decision No. 2872 (1981) (nine newspa-
per articles on general conditions in El Salvador not sufficient evidence). But see Paul v.
I.N.S., 521 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1975) (journalistic accounts used by court to disprove
Haitians' claims); United States ex rel. Mercer v. Experdy, 234 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (newspaper accounts of Haitian conditions grounds for judicial notice and reopening
of INS proceedings).
"I See McMullen v. I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981) (Amnesty International
(AI) report on Ireland among evidence submitted in successful withholding claim); Coriolan
v. I.N.S., 559 F.2d 993, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1977) (reconsideration of report by AI on Haiti
permitted). But see In re Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697 (1979) (same 1976 Al report held
less credible, probative and timely as to current conditions in Haiti than State Department
reports submitted to INS and Congress); Fleurinor v. I.N.S., 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978)
(same Al report that was found sufficient for reconsideration in Coriolan held not so mate-
rial as to warrant reconsideration).
There have recently been several cases in which an immigration judge has granted asylum
despite a State Department advisory opinion to the contrary. In In re A-, File
No. A23108407 (Dec. 10, 1982), a Nicaraguan with ties to the Somoza regime convinced the
immigration judge with no amount of documentary evidence that she had a well-founded
fear of persecution from the Sandinista regime. The judge paid special attention to the 1979
publication of the UNHCR HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REF-
UGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. See 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 26-29 (1983).
In an opinion dated December 8, 1982, another immigration judge granted asylum and
withholding of deportation to an Afghan woman despite an adverse BHRHA opinion. The
judge noted that such letters are merely advisory. This case is especially interesting in that
it may be one of the few in which a person denied refugee status was ultimately granted
asylum. In this instance the applicant presented newspaper articles, letters, affidavits and,
most persuasive, a certificate from the UNHCR declaring her to be a refugee within the
mandate of that organization. See 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 106-10 (1983).
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
a foreign country to determine the reasonableness of a fear to return and
face persecution. Unlike Judge King in Haitian Refugee Center, whose
enthusiasm in going beyond official State Department sources seemed to
stem from heartfelt pity for the plight of the applicants (which may have
led to what the appellate court referred to as his exceeding his authority),
the opinion in McMullen is phrased in more legalistic terms. McMullen,
additionally, opens the door for the serious contention that evidence in-
troduced by the State Department may be inherently flawed by the con-
cerns of realpolitik. Although this would in effect increase the practical
burden on the INS by making it go outside generalized State Department
country profiles to rebut a claim for asylum, such an approach may well
adhere more closely to the standards required by the Refugee Protocol
and the 1980 Refugee Act.
B. Asylum-INA Section 208
Just as the courts are struggling to resolve the conflicts between the law
and its execution by administrative agencies, the Congress has recently
taken an active interest in the procedures for determining asylum claims.
As is generally the case, by the time Congress gets involved, the issue has
come to a head.
1. Politics and Administrative Procedure
Until 1980, the affirmative right to seek asylum was an appendage of
other immigration provisions; 42 any procedures devised came about in
the absence of express legislative guidance. The smaller number of appli-
cants discouraged congressional interest. It was at the cabinet and agency
level that the right to seek asylum received its definition. In response to
the Kudirkas episode in 1971, when a Soviet seaman of Lithuanian de-
scent sought refuge on an American ship and was turned over to his com-
manding officers, the State Department instituted the first general guide-
lines on asylum.14 A public notice issued in early 1972 stated: "The
request of a person for asylum or temporary refuge shall not be arbitrar-
ily refused by U.S. personnel.' ' 4 4 Two years later, the INS proposed regu-
lations on granting asylum pursuant to the Attorney General's mandate
to administer immigration laws. 4' These regulations underwent frequent
,, For a discussion of parole and conditional entry as asylum procedures, see supra note
100.
"4 See Note, The Fleeing Political Refugee's Final Hurdle, 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 9 (1978).
"4 Dep't of State Public Notice No. 351, 37 Fed. Reg. 3447 (1972).
'" The interim rules were presented for public comment on August 7, 1974, in 39 Fed.
Reg. 29,439 (1974). In response to comments received, the INS amended the rules when
promulgating them in final form. 8 C.F.R. § 108 (amended 1978, 1979, repealed 1981).
These changes stipulated that the INS district director was required to seek an advisory
opinion from the State Department on all applications save those clearly lacking in sub-
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revisions in the ensuing years."" One commentator expressed the view
that by 1980 the regulations provided for a procedure "consistent with




The Refugee Act of 1980 for the first time mandated legislatively that
the Attorney General establish an asylum procedure for persons within
the country who met the refugee definition.' 4" The change was more one
stance or those which are clearly meritorious. If the applicant was denied because his appli-
cation was clearly lacking in substance, the State Department was to be notified within 30
days and given an opportunity to respond favorably; any enforced departure was to be
delayed for 30 days. If the application was denied despite a favorable State Department
recommendation, the case was to be certified to the INS regional commissioner. The second
change was a formal statement that a denial of asylum did not preclude a future withhold-
ing of deportation claim under § 243(h) or articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee Protocol.
8 C.F.R. § 108.1, 108.2 (1981) (revoked in 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (1981)).
148 The principal change entailed the transfer of jurisdiction to the immigration judge
over asylum claims made after the start of exclusion and deportation proceedings. These
changes were finalized in 43 Fed. Reg. 40,802 (1978) and 44 Fed. Reg. 21,258 (1979). See
generally 55 INTERPRETER RELEASES 369-78 (1978).
17 Smyth, Immigration and Nationality Law, 1980 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 237, at 248.
Commenting on the significance of these changes, the INS stated that the older system,
under which exclusion or deportation proceedings had to be adjourned if an asylum applica-
tion was advanced, constituted an unnecessary duplication of effort that worked "to the
detriment of the alien because his status remainledi in doubt and to the detriment of the
Service which [was] unable to resolve the proceedings within a reasonable length of time."
43 Fed. Reg. 40,879 (1978).
.48 INA, § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). Theoretically both refugees and asylees must
meet the same standards. See supra notes 116-17. Both groups must not be firmly resettled
in another country. 8 C.F.R. § 207(b) (1983) (for refugees); Id. at §§ 208(f)(ii)-208.14 (for
asylees). Whereas refugees inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(27) (security risks),
§ 212(a)(29) (subversives), § 212(a)(33) (Nazi collaborators) and § 212(a)(23) (narcotics
traffickers) are excluded with no possibility of waiver under 8 C.F.R. § 207.3, the grounds
for mandatory denial of an asylum application are parallel but not clearly spelled out. Those
grounds include being a security risk and having criminal convictions for particularly serious
crimes. Id. at § 208.8(f)(iv), (v).
In practice there is a form of presumption in favor of the applicant for refugee status who
falls within a category that might be called a group refugee pool-groups identified as of
special humanitarian concern to the United States such as Vietnamese or Soviet Jews. The
individual burden of proof, however, is applied strictly to asylum applicants.
In a conversation with the author, E.B. Duarte, director of the INS Outreach Program,
explained one reason for the different approach to applicants for asylum and for refugee
status. Since some applicants for asylum have left their home country with a valid passport
and have obtained a visa from the United States consulate in their home country, there is a
presumption that these people are capable of maintaining a normal relationship with their
own government. In most cases, persons applying for refugee status have not received
United States visas (except for Vietnamese permitted to leave under the Orderly Departure
Program agreed upon by Washington and Hanoi, and for political prisoners from Cuba and
Argentina) and are applying for United States immigration benefits while in a more precari-
ous situation. Telephone interview with E.B. Duarte, Director of INS Outreach Program
(May 26, 1982).
While there may be a logic behind this distinction in some cases, it does not respond to
the problem posed when refugees come directly to the United States.
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of form than substance since no specific guidance was given. New regula-
tions were published in interim form on June 2, 1980, and were made
final on February 9, 1983.'Il Under the regulations adopted pursuant to
the Act, asylum requests are divided into two categories: those made after
exclusion or deportation proceedings have been instituted, and all others.
In the latter situation, the INS district director has jurisdiction; in the
former case, the immigration judge does.150
Under this system any person not yet subject to any kind of expulsion
proceeding may apply for asylum at the discretion of the district direc-
tor,'" regardless of whether he is legally in the United States. Should the
application be denied by the district director, no appeal lies within the
INS system. 6 2 A review of this final action may be taken to the district
court under the Administrative Procedure Act.'
Aliens against whom exclusion proceedings (that is, aliens not officially
"in" the country) or deportation proceedings are brought may raise an
asylum claim in the course of the proceeding. 54 Such a claim is automati-
cally considered to be an application for withholding of exclusion or de-
portation under section 243(h). 5  Should the decision of the immigration
"' 48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983). It might be noted that although two allied chapters of INS
Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 207 (Admission of Refugees) and 8 C.F.R. § 209 (Adjustment of
Status of Refugees and Aliens Granted Asylum), were revised in response to public com-
ment and finalized in 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (1981), asylum procedures were not finalized for
two more years. There must have been a flood of comments, considering the extensive and
detailed comments cited by the INS revised asylum procedures in 1979. See 44 Fed. Reg.
21,253-59 (1979). The INS noted only that a number of commentators suggested a return to
the old system under which the district director heard all asylum claims in a less adversarial
climate than that of an exclusion or deportation hearing. The INS noted that it appreciated
the concerns of those who fled countries with arbitrary judicial systems and sympathized
with their uneasiness in appearing before a judge. Nonetheless, the INS further limited thejurisdiction of the district director. Under the present regulations, even if an application for
asylum is pending before the district director, upon initiation of an exclusion or deportation
proceeding, the applicant must resubmit his application to the immigration judge. 48 Fed.
Reg. 5885 (1983). See generally Note, U.S. Asylum Procedures: Current Status and Propos-
als for Reform, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 405 (1981).
'0 48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983). See supra note 149.
5- 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1983).
"' Id. at § 208.8(c).
.5. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 68 n.6 (1969) (citing
other cases to the effect that the district court has jurisdiction as long as the INS has not
ordered deportation under § 242 of the INA).
"4 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(a) (1983).
Although the definition of persecution in asylum and withholding cases is the same,
there are several important distinctions between the two. An asylum claim will be denied if
the petitioner has been firmly resettled in a third country, whereas firm resettlement is
immaterial in cases of withholding of deportation to a particular country. But withholding is
temporary and dependent upon the discretion of the Attorney General as to terms and du-
ration, while asylum carries a more explicit status. There may also be differences in eligibil-
ity for social welfare programs that depend on an applicant's residing under the color of law
with intent to remain in the United States.
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judge be adverse to the claimant, exclusion or deportation proceedings
are reinstituted. An appeal from a final deportation order lies first with
the Board of Immigration Appeals' and then with the circuit court of
appeals. 57 An exclusion appeal lies only with the Board; a final order
from the BIA may be reviewed judicially only in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing.15 8 It is thus possible for an individual to have a claim for asylum
adjudicated three times-once before the district director, once before
the immigration judge as an asylum claim and again as a section 243(h)
claim-before it goes up for appeal and judicial review.
In adjudicating asylum claims, directors and immigration judges must
request an advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs of the State Department. 59 This represents an innova-
tion introduced after the Refugee Act. Previously, the district director
was obligated to request State Department views only in clearcut cases.'
0
And despite problems in accepting these opinions as dispositive, it can be
argued that the present system is somewhat fairer to the asylum seeker in
that the district director must get a second opinion in all cases. Unfortu-
nately, it is also a significant bureaucratic burden on both the INS and
the State Department."'
The INS developed this complex procedure with no direct congres-
sional input other than the general guidance on rule making, decision
making and judicial review contained in the Administrative Procedure
Act. The recent flood of asylum applications has provoked both the Exec-
utive and Congress to propose that asylum procedures conform to what is
perceived to be the national interest. Here again, the debate over refugee
law, specifically asylum procedures, is a reflection of the debate over refu-
gee, immigration, and foreign policy in general.
2. The Simpson-Mazzoli and the Reagan Administration Bills
Compared
The Reagan Administration sponsored the Omnibus Immigration Con-
trol Act in October, 1981.162 This bill was never reported out of commit-
,56 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1983).
"I In 1961, the INA was amended to provide for the exclusive review of all final orders of
deportation by courts of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982). The purpose of this change was
to eliminate abuse of judicial review as a delaying tactic. See generally Haitian Refugee
Center, 503 F. Supp. at 457-62 nn.28-40.
158 INA, § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1982). After completion of an exclusion or depor-
tation hearing, a request for a reopening to consider asylum will be granted only if the
applicant produces a reasonable explanation for failing to raise the issue earlier. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.11 (1983).
' See supra note 118.
"6o See supra note 145.
See, e.g., Meissner Testimony, supra note 3.
182 Administration bill, supra note 12. Introduced by Senator Thurmond and Representa-
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tee but did provide a backdrop for the more viable Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1982. Popularly called the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, it
was hotly debated throughout 1982 and won Senate approval but died on
the House floor on the day before the 97th Congress adjourned. On that
day, representatives gave Representative Mazzoli a standing ovation for
his efforts to bring the bill to a vote. In keeping with the promises of both
Senator Simpson and Representative Mazzoli, the bills were reintroduced
in February 1983 and hearings began on March 1, 1983.61
tive Rodino, the bill contained 10 titles representing a comprehensive effort to stem the flow
of undocumented aliens to the United States by means of penalizing employers who hired
unauthorized aliens, encouraging undocumented aliens in this country to legalize their sta-
tus by amnesty provisions, increasing the power of the government to turn away un-
desirables and streamlining the adjudication process within the INS, especially in the area
of asylum.
1" On March 17, 1982, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 was introduced
in the Senate by Senator Alan Simpson as S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
S2218 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (summary of major provisions). The bill was introduced in
the House by Representative Romano Mazzoli as H.R. 5827, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Simpson-Mazzoli I]. This bill was less extreme than the Administra-
tion bill in that the high seas interdiction and immigration emergency provisions were omit-
ted. Additionally, many of the proposals that favored efficiency at the expense of due pro-
cess in the asylum area were toned down. On the other hand, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill
sought stricter numerical limits on overall immigration, more onerous penalties for hiring
unauthorized aliens and added a national identity card for employment authorization.
The Senate passed S. 2222 on August 17, 1982, by a wide margin: 80-19. 128 CONG. REC.
D1098 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982). The bill received bipartisan support, perhaps most signifi-
cantly from Senator Kennedy, an important voice in refugee and asylum matters in general
and ranking minority member on the Senate Judiciary Immigration and Refugee Policy
Subcommittee. See 128 CONG. REC. S2220 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982).
In the House of Representatives, the bill was assailed by some 300 amendments as well as
organized opposition from various quarters, including the Black Congressional Caucus,
which opposed strict asylum and exclusion provisions. See 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPTR.
3097. Hispanics also opposed the bill, fearing that employer sanctions would result in dis-
crimination against Spanish speaking individuals. See Pear, Congress Revives Immigration
Issue, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1983, at A9, col. 1.
Attorney General William French Smith transmitted the Administration's original bill to
Congress. He also pledged his support for the Simpson-Mazzoli bill despite the difference
between it and the Administration bill, and the fact that the Administration bill was still
pending on the floor of Congress at the time Simpson-Mazzoli I was introduced. See 128
CONG. REC. S2218 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (statement of Senator Simpson). A cynic might
argue that the Reagan Administration proposed its initial bill to lay ground for a bill that
might ultimately meet its needs; it has been suggested that the unexpected support for the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill may have stemmed from the fear "that if this bill is not supported, a
bill containing some much more extreme provisions may become law." 59 INTERPREER RE-
LEASES 248 (1982).
On February 17, 1983, Senator Simpson reintroduced the bill that was passed by the Sen-
ate on August 17, 1982. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Simpson-
II]. Representative Mazzoli introduced H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) which is
identical to the bill approved by the House Judiciary Committee on September 22, 1982[hereinafter cited as Mazzoli-II]. Both bills are entitled The Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1983. For summaries of the key provisions and statements by the sponsors, see
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A number of provisions of both bills are a direct attempt to cope with
the backlog in both the INS and the State Department resulting from the
volume of asylum applications. By the time the Simpson-Mazzoli bill was
introduced, the number of pending cases had climbed to 140,000.164
Title IV of the Administration bill-the Fair and Expeditious Appeal,
Asylum and Exclusion Act-and Part C of the original Simpson and
Mazzoli bills-Adjudication Procedures and Asylum-propose explicit
asylum procedures that either carve out exceptions to general practice
under the Administrative Procedure Act or repeal changes adopted in
conformity with the Refugee Act.
It has been argued that the current structure of the INS does not pro-
vide for the effective processing of asylum petitions because inspectors
are often poorly informed about conditions in the applicant's country of
origin ' and because asylum claims are frequently raised in an adver-
sarial context during exclusion or deportation proceedings."' The Admin-
istration bill met this particular objection by separating asylum claims
from other immigration matters, in particular expulsion proceedings, and
by creating a new class of INS employees: asylum officers.1 Under the
Administration bill, these officers would be trained to conduct formal,
nonadversary interviews to determine whether the applicant met the
standards of eligibility set in the Refugee Act.
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill follows this lead insofar as it separates asy-
129 CONG. REC. H570, S1342 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983). In submitting the House version of
the bill, Representative Mazzoli stated that "[t]e bill contains elements which virtually
every analyst of immigration reform believes are necessary if we are to bring order out of
the present immigration chaos." 129 CONG. REC. at H570.
129 CONG. REC. H570 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983). The Cuban/Haitian Temporary Resi-
dent Act, part of the Administration bill, contained provisions to eliminate fully half of the
burden on the INS by legislative fiat, granting temporary resident status to an estimated
140,000 Cubans and Haitians in the United States before the start of 1981, of whom at least
50,000 had filed for asylum. H.R. REP. No. 1218, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3810, 3826; Meissner Testimony, supra note 3, at 1.
To unburden the INS, the bill provided for the automatic denial of all pending asylum
applications by persons in the class affected and prohibited anyone holding such status from
applying for asylum. Administration bill, § 304, 127 CONG. REC. at S11,996 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1981).
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill also provided for the Attorney General to use discretion in
granting temporary resident status to all those with the status of Cuban/Haitian (status
pending), the ad hoc classification granted by the Carter Administration at the time of the
Mariel Flotilla. Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, § 301.
"' See Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 527-29 (pointing out that inspectors who
conducted interviews received no briefings or special information about Haiti).
'" Posner and Kaplan, Who Should We Let In, HUMAN RIGHTS, Summer 1981, 14, 50.
'6 Administration bill, § 403, 127 CONG. REC. at S11,996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981). Asy-
lum determinations would be completely separated from decisions by the district director
and the immigration judge. This would be reinforced by the restriction that asylum officers
would not be permitted to engage in any investigation or prosecution of exclusion or depor-
tation cases.
1983-84]
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lum hearings from all others. However, it goes one step further in specify-
ing that INS officials who handle asylum applications are to be adminis-
trative law judges (ALJ's), specifically trained in international relations
and international law but who have not previously adjudicated INS cases.
More significantly, though, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill provides for a full
adversary hearing with a right to cross examination and a written
record."16
Under the Administration bill, the asylum seeker was permitted to re-
tain counsel at no expense to the government, but the attorney was not
allowed to advocate for his client and a case could not be rescheduled to
permit an attorney to attend.6 9 Neither past nor present asylum regula-
tions mention the right to counsel, but the courts have spoken of the
right to be represented by an attorney in an asylum hearing as a basic
due process right. In Haitian Refugee Center, for example, the court em-
phasized that mass scheduling of asylum interviews was prejudicial to the
Haitians' rights to adequate legal representation. 70 And Louis v. Meiss-
ner, another Haitian class action suit, ruled that the detention of Hai-
tians in remote centers in Texas and West Virginia "thwarted the statu-
tory and regulatory rights" to be represented in exclusion proceedings
and, by extension, in the asylum claims that might arise during such
hearings.17 1
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill expressly provides for full-scale representa-
tion by an attorney during an asylum hearing. 17' No doubt the change is
due in part to the legal profession's adverse response to the way the Ad-
ministration bill would have tied the hands of lawyers."' 3 The Adminis-
tration bill would have done away with the requirement that an opinion
be sought from the State Department in each case. Instead, the decision
whether to request information from any government agency would have
been left to the discretion of the asylum officer. 1 4 The Simpson-Mazzoli
"' Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, § 124.
'69 Administration bill, § 403, 127 CONG. REC. at S11,996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
170 503 F. Supp. at 523-26. Although the findings as to representation by counsel refer
principally to the fact that the treatment of Haitians was discriminatory as compared to the
treatment of other asylum seekers, there is a strong due process argument along with the
equal protection analysis in the repeated discussion of "adequate representation."
171 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla.) (temporary restraining order granted), rev'd in part, 532
F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (on standing issues).
172 Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, § 124.
13 For an example of the type of criticism aimed at the Administration bill, see letter to
the editor, John Shattuck and Wade J. Henderson, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1982, at 26A, col. 4
[hereinafter cited as Shattuck-Henderson letter]. The authors of this letter are, respectively,
Director and Legislative Co'unsel of the American Civil Liberties Union's Legislative Office.
174 Administration bill, § 403, 127 CONG. R.c. at S11,996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981). Special
training of the asylum officer should overcome the current problem of ignorance on the part
of immigration inspectors as to conditions in the country of origin. Nevertheless, it would be
wise to mandate some kind of participation by the State Department, both to keep the
State Department apprised of the INS involvement in an issue that clearly impinges on
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bills do not mention the BHRHA but state that "procedures set forth in
this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining asy-
lum," 17 which seems to obviate the present INS requirement for a
BHRHA reference.
3. Judicial Review
The underlying impulse which unites both the Administration bill and
the Simpson-Mazzoli bills is the curtailment of administrative appeal and
judicial review of asylum decisions. Only fifteen years before, when Presi-
dent Johnson transmitted the Refugee Protocol to the Senate for advice
and consent, he wrote that United States accession might promote more
liberal refugee laws in other hesitant countries. Now, faced with uninvited
refugee seekers, the law makers are seeking to slow the migration by de-
nying to asylum seekers the traditional guarantees of procedural review
which were previously permitted to aliens and citizens alike.
Under the Administration bill, a determination by an asylum officer
would not be subject to any administrative review, other than by discre-
tionary certification requested by the INS Commissioner or the Attorney
General. 176 As part of its general overhaul of INS appeal and review pro-
cedures, Simpson-Mazzoli would subject an ALJ's asylum decision to re-
view by a newly constituted six-member United States Immigration
Board. This board would replace the current three-member Board of Im-
migration Appeals and would review cases under a standard of "substan-
tial evidence on the record as a whole. 1' 77 This is a deferential reasona-
bleness test currently used in the judicial review of final administrative
acts.
Judicial review would be virtually eliminated under both bills. Under
the Administration bill, review provisions under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act were expressly eliminated, and a court could consider an asy-
lum claim only in a challenge to exclusion or deportation. The standard
of review at that time would have been limited to guarding against an
arbitrary, capricious or illegal ruling."7 Under Simpson-Mazzoli as origi-
nally introduced in 1982 and reintroduced in the Senate in 1983, judicial
review is expressly eliminated as to final orders on asylum applications,
except in habeas corpus petitions. 7 This would prevent the review of an
asylum denial during a circuit court review of a deportation order. This
foreign policy and to offer supervision to asylum officers who will be caught up in demand-
ing face-to-face interviews with desperate people.
'T' Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 162, § 124.
'6 Administration bill, § 403, 127 CONG. REc. at S11,996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
'7 Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 162, § 123. Under present law the Board may exercise
"such discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropri-
ate and necessary for the disposition of the case." 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (1983).
..8 Administration bill, § 403(d), 127 CONG. REC. at S11,996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
"0 Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, § 123; Simpson-II supra note 163, § 123.
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restrictive approach was rejected in the House of Representatives. The
bill reintroduced by Representative Mazzoli in February 1983 (which is
the same as the one reported out of the House Judiciary Committee in
September 1982) would permit the review of asylum decisions in the cir-
cuit court as part of the review of an exclusion or deportation order."
The significance of these changes is that they would take back what
McMullen and the Refugee Act gave in guaranteeing an impartial review
of asylum claims in order to offset any built-in bias of determinations as
to persecution made by the political arms of government. Under the Ad-
ministration bill, for example, withholding of deportation would have
been eliminated as a separate form of relief, 8 ' and section 243(h) would
be subsumed by asylum proceedings.' This would replace the
mandatory injunction against deportation adopted in the Refugee Act
with the pre-1980 standard and its attendant conflict with the Refugee
Protocol. In a statement made upon introduction of the bill, Senator
Thurmond professed that this standard would satisfy the requirements of
article 33 of the United Nations Convention and suggested that it is "in-
congruous to have a mandatory withholding provision and a discretionary
asylum provision.' 8 3
The Simpson bill now pending in the Senate would have the same ef-
fect, for although it does not expressly repeal section 243(h), it does do so
in practice because section 243(h) is amended to conform with proce-
dures applicable to asylum claims under section 208."8 The House ver-
sion of the bill, which permits judicial review of asylum applications,
would apparently use the substantial evidence test. 85
As part of its overall attempt to expedite the resolution of immigration
matters, the Administration bill proposed reduced time limits for appeals
of deportation orders and all other INS administrative decisions.' In ad-
dition, there was a sharp reduction in the amount of time available to an
alien to apply for asylum. From the moment exclusion or deportation pro-
ceedings began, the alien would have fourteen days in which to petition
for asylum. In the absence of such a timely claim, only a clear showing of
changed circumstances in the country of origin would suffice to waive this
1so Mazzoli-II, supra note 163, § 123.
181 Administration bill, § 406, 127 CONG. REC. at S11,996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
182 Id. § 403, 127 CONG. REC. at Sll, 996.
1 127 CONG. REC. S12,065, S12,66 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Thur-
mond Statement]. Senator Thurmond's conclusion does not necessarily follow because with-
holding deportation may entail granting fewer benefits than granting asylum.
"" Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, § 124; Simpson-II, supra note 163, § 124.
:85 Mazzoli-II, supra note 163, § 123.
" The Administration bill reduces from six months to 30 days the time limit for appeal-
ing any deportation order or any other administrative action. Administration bill, §§ 401,
402, 127 CONG. REC. at S11996 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
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time limit.' 1 Simpson-Mazzoli retains these provisions' despite con-
cerns that they "will require many aliens to apply for asylum long before
it is determined that they are inadmissible or deportable in the first
187 Id. § 403, 127 CONG. REc. at S11,996. Summary exclusion proceedings might also de-
prive certain individuals of the right to raise asylum claims altogether. A proposed amend-
ment to § 235(b) of the INA would give immigration officers extensive powers, unreviewable
both within the INS and by the judiciary, to exclude crewmen, stowaways and aliens lacking
proper entry documents. Id. § 404, 127 CONG. REc. at S11,996. It is not exactly clear under
the Administration proposal how the initial interview between the alien and the immigra-
tion officer would affect the asylum claim. In his letter of transmittal to Congress, Attorney
General Smith wrote that the initial questioning would be conducted by an asylum officer
but that no written transcript would be made (as distinguished from the actual asylum
hearing when a record of the proceedings would be kept). This procedure is not indicated in
the wording of the Administration bill. Letter from Attorney General William French Smith
to the Vice President of the United States (transmitting the Omnibus Immigration Control
Act (updated)), reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. S12,084-85 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
Under the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, summary exclusion can be prevented by presentation of
proper documents, a reasonable basis for legal entry or an application for asylum. Simpson-
Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, § 121.
In her testimony before Congress, Acting INS Commissioner Meissner stated that "transit
without visa" aliens who decide to seek asylum would not be permitted to submit applica-
tions. In anticipation of criticism that this policy might violate the non-refoulement prov-
sions of the Refugee Convention, Meissner argued that these aliens are free to travel to their
intended destination to seek asylum there. Meissner Testimony, supra note 3, at 3.
Concern over this phenomenon arose recently in the case of citizens from Afghanistan
whose attempts to obtain asylum in the United States prompted amendment of INS and
Bureau of Consular Affairs regulations to withdraw transit visa privileges for Afghans. See
8 C.F.R. § 212.1(e) (1983); 22 C.F.R. § 41.6(e) (1983). The State Department explained the
problem as follows:
Aliens accepted for transit without a visa are not required to be in possession of a
valid visa in order to effect passage through the United States en route to an
ultimate destination. In recent months, however, citizens of Afghanistan believing
they have a claim to refugee status have tried to circumvent refugee procedures
abroad by using the transit without visa waiver privilege to enter the United
States and immediately applying for asylum as refugees. The Department has ver-
ified cases in which Afghan citizens whose applications for United States refugee
and/or visa status had been denied at U.S. missions abroad have entered the
United States without visas. Other cases concern Afghan citizens who destroyed
their travel documents and onward tickets on aircraft in flight to prevent continu-
ation of their travel beyond the United States. These Afghan citizens remain in
the United States pending adjudication of applications for political asylum. Sev-
eral groups have already reached the United States under these circumstances and
it is believed probable that another large group is about to follow.
47 Fed. Reg. 5990, 5990 (1982).
188 Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, at §§ 123, 124. There had been some confusion in
the language of the Administration bill which led Acting INS Commissioner Meissner to tell
Congress that an alien would have to seek asylum within 14 days of any entry inspection in
order to prevent belated claims by persons who enter "ostensibly for the purpose of seeking
asylum" and then avoid the "very authorities who may grant asylum." Meissner Testimony,
supra note 3 at 2. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill clarified this matter by stating directly that an
alien must apply for asylum within 14 days from the date of service of notice instituting an
expulsion proceeding.
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place."' 8 9
The spirit behind both the Administration bill and the various Simp-
son and Mazzoli bills is that "an alien seeking entry has only those rights
which Congress determines should be extended to him."'9 0 Immigration is
an area in which Congress has near plenary power to set standards.
Nearly a century ago the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of
Orientals from immigration to the United States under the argument that
a state's right to exclude aliens "is part of its independence. If it could
not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power."191 Although Congress has subsequently determined that
United States immigration laws should not discriminate on the basis of
race, there is no reason why, barring some superior authority, Congress
could not reverse itself. Quite recently the Supreme Court held that in
matters of immigration "Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." '92
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks of a right to seek
and enjoy asylum but not of a right to be granted asylum. 93 The Refugee
Convention, which now has the force of law in the United States, does
provide binding obligations not to return an alien to a frontier where he
will face persecution, but says nothing of procedure or acceptable due
process standards. 94 Critics of the Administration's proposed asylum and
exclusion procedures attacked the bill for "favor[ing] . . . efficiency at
the expense of fairness and fundamental due process,"' 95 and instead sug-
gested the creation of an independent immigration judiciary to expedite
the adjudication of claims with adequate legal representation. Most con-
troversial, perhaps, is the critics' proposal that the system include "an
effective right of appeal, with an independent review board composed of
members from the United States Government, the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees and nongovernmental agencies concerned with
refugee issues."' 96 At a time when the prestige of the United Nations has
fallen quite low in the United States, this smacks of unreality, but it may
not be out of line with the spirit of the Refugee Convention.
While not as harsh as the response to the Reagan Administration bill,
commentary on Simpson-Mazzoli has criticized the elimination of federal
court jurisdiction to review asylum cases and, inspired by Haitian and
. 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 256 (1982).
190 Thurmond Statement, 127 CONG. REC. at S12,067 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981) (citing
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)).
', The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
192 Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
'9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
Refugee Convention, supra note 21, at art. 33.
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Salvadoran class action suits, the lack of a statutory requirement that
aliens arriving at the border be advised of their right to counsel should
they wish to raise a claim for asylum. 9 7 Just as the courts' independent
inquiry into an individual's claim of persecution would provide the surest
protection of a refugee's claim to asylum, the right to appeal to an impar-
tial body is basic to the fair resolution of asylum issues. A case may be
made that such a review or, at the very least, an advisory review, is man-
dated by the Refugee Protocol.
Regardless of the form in which Simpson-Mazzoli is eventually passed,
the terms of the debate indicate that we are entering a new era. The ma-
jority sentiment in Congress appears to be that a lack of firm guidance
has permitted the courts and the INS to battle over the proper asylum
procedures and in the process thousands of people became mired in court
cases that never reached substantive issues. The amnesty provisions of
the bills represent a fresh start both for the aliens and for the INS. It
might be, however, that in cutting back on due process rights asserted by
the courts and officially incorporated into United States law from the
Refugee Protocol, Congress will simply invite a new round of litigation
and delay.
V. THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, ASYLEES AND ASYLUM APPLICANTS
Refugee law and policy may be divided into two basic areas. The first,
which has been discussed until this point, concerns the definition of eligi-
ble parties and the rules for establishing eligibility. The second area,
which complements the first, involves the granting of resettlement oppor-
tunities to refugees and asylees. Both political and humanitarian consid-
erations are involved in these policies.
From a humanitarian point of view, there can be no true asylum from
persecution until the individual can begin life anew and know that his
sojourn will not be disrupted in the normal course of events. Among the
rights that are most crucial in this regard are the right to work and to
receive various welfare services, the right to adjust one's status, and, in
the process of applying for asylum, the right to due process of law."'8
In terms of policy, the treatment of refugees is a part of the larger
problem of incorporating aliens into the political system to avoid the po-
l' Representative of the response of the legal profession was that of the American Bar
Association which resolved that it opposed "legislative proposals relating to immigration
and naturalization that would limit the rights of persons subject to retain counsel and to
exclusion, deportation or asylum proceedings to retain counsel and to enjoy full representa-
tion." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SUMMARY ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 20 (Feb.
1983).
198 These rights are envisaged in general terms in article 26 of the Refugee Convention:
"Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose
their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations
applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances." 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 172.
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larization of society into two classes: those with full rights and those with
fewer. In addition, refugees fleeing regimes that constrain independent
thought or expression may bring special talents and energies to the coun-
try of refuge. 9s
A. On Parole
Under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the Refugee Relief Act of
1953, refugees were admitted as a special category of aliens. Before ad-
mission, each refugee had to obtain sponsorship and assurances of decent
housing and suitable employment that would not displace an American
worker. Adjustment of parole status to that of permanent resident re-
quired establishing a fear of persecution and good moral character for the
preceding five years, a recommendation by the Attorney General and a
concurrent resolution by both houses of Congress. 0 0
Refugee parole bore certain similarities to the status provisions under
the first two post-war refugee acts. Parolees were not permanent resi-
dents and were subject to grounds for excludability upon application for
adjustment of status.2 ' However, parole differed in numerous ways from
the status of displaced persons and Refugee Relief Act beneficiaries. It
has been held that parole is not an admission to the United States but a
means for allowing provisional status to otherwise inadmissible aliens.202
'9 The contributions to America of refugee scientists, scholars, dancers and artists from
pre-war Germany and from Eastern Europe in the post-war era, from Albert Einstein to
Henry Kissinger and Mikhail Baryshnikov are immeasurable.
200 The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009; the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400. In both cases the refugee had to sign a
good faith pledge to take the job found for him by his sponsor and was liable to deportation
should he become a public charge within five years from a cause that antedated his arrival
in the United States.
Sponsorship has remained a feature of refugee law under the Refugee Act. The original
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act stated that refugee status would not be author-
ized "until assurances of employment and housing in the United States for a period of one
year are presented." 8 C.F.R. § 207.2(b) (1981) (superseded). Comments submitted to the
INS after publication of the interim rules suggested eliminating sponsorship, but the INS
argued that "it would be improper to allow refugees to enter this country without providing
an orderly program under which these refugees would be assured transportation to their
destination, housing, and assistance in this country." 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (1981). The final
regulations make provisions for agency sponsorship and specify only that transportation be
provided. "Each applicant must be sponsored by a responsible person or organization."
8 C.F.R. § 207.2(d) (1983).
0 INA, § 212(a)(1)-(33), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (1982) (grounds for refusal of a
visa).
2 Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (parolee found ineligible for § 243(h)
withholding of deportation). This situation has been changed by amendment of § 243(h)
under the 1980 Refugee Act to require the Attorney General not to "deport or return" a
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The parolee is not within the country and hence is subject to exclusion
rather than deportation. This peculiarity of American law results in the
rather ironic situation where a parolee, who has entered the country le-
gally, may become subject to exclusion proceedings while an alien who
enters the country illegally is deportable for entering improperly. The dis-
tinction between exclusion and deportation may be significant since the
former proceeding affords far fewer due process rights than does the
latter.20 3
Because they entered without congressional authorization, refugee pa-
rolees required specific statutory authorization to adjust their status.
2 0 4
Under the Fair Share Act of 1960,'05 parole was authorized by congres-
sional statute for a limited period to eliminate the remaining refugee
camps in Europe. The Act included provisions for refugee-parolees admit-
ted under its terms to adjust their status to that of permanent resident
after two years.
2 0 6
This general approach to refugee admissions was adopted in the 1965
INA amendments which established the seventh preference for refu-
gees.2 7 The concept was the same as parole, but Congress chose the term
"conditional entrant" because the term parole has undesirable connota-
tions.20 8 The two-year wait before a refugee became eligible for perma-
nent residence status remained.
B. The Refugee Convention
American accession to the Refugee Protocol brought United States ref-
ugee practice into potential conflict with its treaty obligations. Article 32
of the Refugee Convention restricts the parties from expelling "a refugee
lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public
order. 2 0 9 Since parolees and conditional entrants were not "lawfully" in
203 In deportation proceedings, the government bears the burden of proving deportability,
but in exclusion proceedings, the alien must prove that he is not excludable. Whereas aliens
are covered by the due process clause of the Constitution, persons undergoing exclusion
proceedings must be given a fair hearing, but not full due process. Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
It has been argued that this distinction is more theoretical than real because excludability
at the time of entry is a common ground for deportation. The alien must establish the cir-
cumstances of his entry, or he is presumed to be in the country illegally. See INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, STAFF REPORT (1979).
204 See, e.g., Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (permitting Hun-
garian parolees of 1956 to adjust their status to permanent resident after two years).
205 H.R. J. Res. 397, 745 Stat. 504 (1960).
'" Id. at 505.
207 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (current version at
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1982)).
200 S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3328, 3335.
20I See supra note 21.
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the territory, they might have been subject to exclusion on grounds other
than those specified in article 32. This potential conflict was addressed in
In re Dunar, where the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed the Sen-
ate's adoption of the Refugee Protocol and concluded that it would not be
a violation of article 32 to deport an alien who met the refugee definition
but had overstayed a visa after entering the country legally.2 1° Were this
not so, the BIA argued, a refugee would become a permanent resident
without going through established administrative channels.2 ,' While it
did not explicitly deal with parolees or conditional entrants in its deci-
sion, the BIA's acceptance of a strict interpretation of "lawful" could
have resulted in exclusion of refugees on grounds other than national se-
curity or public order. The BIA felt that this problem was only theoreti-
cal and not real, however, since it accepted State Department assurances
that refugees would not be excluded for such grounds as mental illness
resulting in institutionalization or becoming a public charge. 212
The reason for immediately denying immigrant status to refugees was
that refugee applicants often lacked the necessary documentation to fall
within the inspection requirements for admission. As a result, the actual
procedure whereby refugee parolees and conditional entrants became per-
manent resident aliens was not the typical adjustment of status, such as
that available to persons previously inspected for nonimmigrant visas, but
admission by inspection. 213 At the time of inspection, refugee applicants
for permanent resident status had to prove again that they were not ex-
cludable. In recognition of the fact they they had been in the United
States for at least two years, refugees were eligible to "roll back" the date
at which their permanent residence became effective to the date of arrival
in this country.214
C. The Refugee Act of 1980
The initial Senate version of the 1980 Refugee Act sought to eliminate
the distinction between refugees and other immigrants by granting per-
manent resident status to normal flow refugees. 2'5 This would have bene-
fited refugees in several ways. First, it would have eliminated the poten-
tial conflict with article 32 of the Refugee Convention by placing refugees
2o 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 315-18 (1973).
2)1 Id. at 315-16.
21 Id. at 318.
... See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(e) (1983) (parolees and conditional entrants to be examined
for admissibility).
2" In In re Calka, 17 I. & N. Dec. 430 (1979), the BIA rejected an application for adjust-
ment of status under INA, § 203(g), by an alien who had previously been granted voluntary
departure and subsequently gained conditional entry status, on the grounds that the two-
year period of eligibility for rollback begins only after refugee status is obtained.
2I SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 147-49. The Senate
adopted unchanged the bill as originally drafted by the Administration.
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within the country from the start. Conditional entry and parole resulted
in a curious anomaly: although refugees were authorized to obtain welfare
benefits since they were in the country under color of law with the intent
to remain, the acceptance of such benefits such as SSI or general relief
would make them technically ineligible for admission or to adjust their
status.2 16 Second, it would have eliminated other problems stemming
from the lack of permanent resident status. Although refugees were given
work authorization, employers were sometimes hesitant to hire a refugee
with parole status. Moreover, some state licensing authorities limit the
rights of non-permanent resident aliens.21
Despite these arguments, the House Committee favored retaining a gap
in time between physical entrance and legal admission. Representative
Holtzman expressed the fear that the direct admission of refugees as per-
manent residents would seriously impair the ability of the INS to screen
arrivals, particularly against potential security threats and drug
dealers.2 18
The 1980 Refugee Act represents a compromise between the House and
Senate views. A new status, refugee, has been created, and persons admit-
ted as refugees "shall be required to appear before an immigration officer
one year after entry in order to determine his/her admissibility.""
2 9 In
actuality this means that refugees may apply for permanent resident sta-
tus after a year. The Refugee Act exempts refugees from certain grounds
for exclusion,220 most significantly the literacy 221 and public charge
2'6 In In re Vindman, 16 I. & N. Dec. 131 (1977), an INS regional commissioner refused
to adjust to permanent residence the status of refugees who were receiving welfare benefits
and were hence excludable under INA, § 212(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1982) (likely to
become a public charge). This conflict between admissibility as a refugee but inadmissibility
to permanent residence on the grounds of becoming a public charge has been eliminated by
provisions of the Refugee Act exempting refugees from that section.
217 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 147. The committee
was impressed by concerns expressed by representatives of voluntary agencies that work in
resettlement, who stated that the lack of permanent resident status would interfere with
acculturation.
211 H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979).
21 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a) (1983). The procedure remains that of admission by inspection.
220 The grounds exempted are labor certification requirement which had previously been
expressly applicable to seventh preference refugees, INA, § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(14) (1982); travel document and visa requirements, id. § 212(a)(20), (21),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20), (21); and restrictions on medical graduates from unaccredited
schools, id. § 212(a)(32), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3 2 ). See also infra notes 221-22.
21 The literacy test first appeared in § 3 of the Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, as a
means of restricting immigration, but persons seeking admission "to avoid religious persecu-
tion" were exempted from this requirement. Ch.29, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (repealed 1952). There
were unsuccessful attempts to extend the exemption to persons fleeing political and racial
persecution. See E. HUTCHINSON, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1789-1965 at 524 (1981). Section 212(b) of the INA exempts immediate family of admissible
aliens and refugees fleeing religious persecution from the test, but not until the 1980 Refu-
gee Act were all refugees excepted from this requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (1982).
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grounds.222 With the exception of grounds involving national security,
other grounds for exclusion may be waived "for humanitarian purposes,
to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest. ' '223
This provision parallels the initial granting of a refugee visa with one im-
portant difference: in the case of the visa, no appeal lies from the over-
seas immigration officer's failure to grant a discretionary waiver, whereas
in the case of a refugee's applying for adjustment of status, an appeal
from a determination of inadmissibility lies in an exclusion hearing.224
D. Asylum Status
In addition to the provision in the 1980 Refugee Act for granting asy-
lum, there is a provision for granting an adjustment of asylum status to
that of permanent resident. In the past, persons obtaining asylum were
granted individual parole or indefinite voluntary departure. 22 " In both
cases the INS could authorize employment, and asylees were eligible for
certain social entitlement programs. But there were no provisions in the
law for adjustment of status.
The Refugee Act provides for the adjustment of up to 5,000 asylees to
permanent resident status each year, 2 6 which sum is to be deducted from
the number of congressionally mandated refugee admissions. Asylees have
the benefit of the same statutory exceptions to grounds for exclusion as
refugees. 127
Under regulations promulgated by the INS, asylees are obligated to be
interviewed each year to determine continuing eligibility. 2 8 After the
publication of interim regulations, the INS received comments question-
ing the statutory authority for granting asylum for only one year and sug-
gesting that the annual interview should be waived unless the INS con-
templates termination of asylum status. 9  In response, the INS
interpreted the Refugee Act to require annual inspection as part of the
general mandate to provide for effective resettlement and absorption of
admitted refugees.22
It is noteworthy that one of the changes made in the final rules is the
212 The exemption of refugees from § 212(a)(15) of the INA will mean that refugees who
receive public assistance can adjust their status. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1982). See supra
note 216. This provision should be read together with the other provisions of the Refugee
Act which provide for extensive reimbursement to states for public monies spent on support
and resettlement.
222 INA, § 208(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
.2 8 C.F.R. § 209.1 (1983).
121 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 148.
226 INA, § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982).
27 See supra, notes 220-22.
28 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e)(1) (1982).
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provision of a waiting list for asylum recipients who wish to adjust their
status.2 3" ' With up to 50,000 applications tendered each year for asylum
and no limit on the number of asylum applications that may be granted,
provision for 5,000 status adjustments each year appears quite insignifi-
cant. It has been suggested that because asylum applications may take
years to adjudicate, the provision for rolling back the date at which per-
manent residence takes effect by only one year may be unfair. The re-
sponse to this reasoning has been that the time spent waiting for the
granting of refugee status is not counted toward eligibility for permanent
resident status. While it is true that there are Indochinese who have
waited years in camps in Southeast Asia, recognition that an asylum ap-
plicant already in the United States has different concerns would not nec-
essarily be inappropriate.
An important part of the Refugee Act concerns provision for the reset-
tlement of refugees. 2 ' This entails the development and financing of ori-
entation, language instruction, job training and other programs. The Ref-
ugee Act expressly limits the benefits of these programs to refugees and
excludes asylees.2 s s One possible reason for this is that the Refugee Act
did not envisage the kind of mass asylum experience that has arisen in
the past few years.
E. Special Status for Cubans and Haitians
At the time of the Cuban influx in 1980, a question arose as to the
treatment of those arriving in southern Florida by fishing boat.22 4 If they
were singled out as a group of special concern to the United States, the
members might have enjoyed the less rigorous burden of proof usually
placed on refugees as opposed to asylees. Also, they would have become
eligible for the refugee resettlement assistance provided in the Refugee
Act, and localities would have been guaranteed federal reimbursement for
resettlement outlays. The key issue that had to be resolved was a deter-
mination of their rights under the law as asylum applicants. Regulations
provide that "upon the filing of a non-frivolous" asylum application the
district director may grant employment authorization..2 5 But because an
,.. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a) (1983).
232 Title IV, ch. 2 creates an Office of Refugee Assistance to supervise the planning and
financing of various programs.
213 Section 412(a)(10) of the Refugee Act limits benefits under tit. IV to normal flow and
emergency refugees. INA, § 412(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(10) (1982).
131 Cohodas, Cuban Rufugee Crisis May Prompt Introduction of Special Legislation,
1980 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1496, 1496. Senator Kennedy notes that a disagreement devel-
oped between Congress, where some members wanted to treat the boat people as emergency
refugees under § 207 of the Refugee Act, and the Administration, which argued that the
emergency provisions were not intended to handle refugee emergencies on American shores.
Kennedy, supra note 11, at 153-55.
.3. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1983).
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applicant for asylum is not permanently residing in the United States
under color of law, he is ineligible for most social service benefits. 36
In the face of the Cuban emergency, the Carter Administration paroled
the emigres not as refugees (mass refugee parole being expressly prohib-
ited by the Refugee Act) but as a new category-entrants. The parole was
extended to Haitians undergoing INS exclusion, deportation and asylum
proceedings. 237 Parolees were granted work authorization and became eli-
gible for general and medical assistance. But they were not eligible for
special resettlement benefits under the Refugee Act. To provide assis-
tance to local districts flooded with non-English-speaking newcomers,
Congress enacted the Refugee Education Assistance Act in October
198038 to give federal reimbursement for educational and certain other
resettlement expenditures.
In the past, refugee parolees were regularly granted the possibility of
adjusting their status to permanent resident by special legislation. The
standard requirements were proof of nonexcludability and two years' resi-
dence in the United States. Such adjustment of status is not available to
the Cubans and Haitians. The Cuban/Haitian Temporary Resident Act,
proposed as part of the Reagan Administration's Omnibus Immigration
Control Act, included a mechanism for adjustment of status, but its terms
differed considerably from the conditions applicable to refugees and
asylees. 2 9 The Simpson-Mazzoli bills address this issue in Title III("Legislation") and its provisions track the Administration bill very
closely.240
236 See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS MANUAL §§ 2333, 2375 (1981), listing eligible aliens
as permanent residents, conditional entrants, refugees, asylees, parolees, Indochinese parol-
ees, deferred status aliens (deportable but not deported for humanitarian reasons-probably§ 243(h) or voluntary departure cases) and others, but not applicants for asylum.
237 A six month parole began on June 20, 1980, and the Administration developed legisla-
tion which would have permitted adjustment of status to permanent resident after two
years, on a model with past refugee experiences. The Cuban/Haitian Entrant bill (status
pending) was introduced in the Senate and House on August 5, 1980, as S. 3013 and
H.R. 7978, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. along with an amendment by Senator Kennedy to declare
the Cubans and Haitians as outright refugees. Neither bill met with success.
238 Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799 (1980) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1522 note(1982)). The very name of the bill is a further example of the general confusion in this area.
The House Report noted this fact, stating: "[Tihe use of the term 'Refugee' in the title of
this bill and the definition used to characterize the recent Cuban and Haitian emigres does
not, in any way, modify the treatment of these emigres under the Refugee Act or any other
Federal statute." H.R. REP. No. 1218, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3810, 3819.
"I Administration bill, tit. III, 127 CONG. REc. at S11,994 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981). The
benefits of this bill would be available to Cubans paroled into the United States between
April 20, 1980, and January 1, 1981; Haitians subject to exclusion or deportation proceed-
ings pending on December 31, 1980; Haitians paroled under § 212(d)(5) or granted volun-
tary departure status; and Cubans and Haitians with asylum applications pending on De-
cember 31, 1980.
240 Simpson-Mazzoli-I, supra note 163, tit. III.
[Vol. 32:117
50https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss1/10
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
F. The Simpson-Mazzoli Solution- Temporary Residence
Under Simpson-Mazzoli, three categories of aliens without lawful status
are eligible for certain types of adjustment: those in the United States
illegally prior to 1978, those here prior to 1980, and those with the status
of Cuban/Haitian (status pending). Potential asylees may fall into all
three categories. Conceivably, there is a problem of proof when aliens are
asked to establish that they entered the country prior to January 1, 1978,
in order to be eligible for permanent resident status immediately, or in-
stead to establish entry prior to 1980 in order to be eligible for any bene-
fits at all.
Aliens in the last two categories-those who arrived illegally between
1978 and 1980 and those already registered with the INS in the ad hoc
category of Cuban/Haitian (status pending)-would be eligible for the
new status of temporary resident if they applied within a year of eligibil-
ity. The juridical status of temporary residents is analogous to that of the
older conditional entrant in that it is two stages removed from citizen-
ship. A temporary resident must first adjust his status to permanent resi-
dent to be eligible for eventual naturalization.
Temporary residents would be authorized to work and travel abroad
but would be ineligible for federal financial assistance (with exceptions
for SSI applicants and candidates for emergency medical care). A special
exception is made for Cuban/Haitian (status pending) people currently
receiving help under the Refugee Education Assistance Act. The law also
explicitly authorizes states to make temporary residents ineligible for lo-
cal financial aid programs.
The most novel element of the concept of temporary resident is its pro-
vision for the adjustment of status. Subject to the Attorney General's dis-
cretion, a temporary resident who applies within six months after receiv-
ing temporary status becomes eligible for permanent residence if he can
show admissibility under section 212 of the INA with certain exceptions,
and rudimentary mastery of English or progress to that end. Unlike
asylees, temporary residents would not be spared meeting the literacy re-
quirements and public charge grounds for exclusion as a matter of law,
but would be dependent upon the Attorney General's discretion "for hu-
manitarian purposes, to assure family unity or when it is in the public
interest."2 4
In two ways the bill seems to incorporate the 1980's spirit into the con-
"' There are a few differences between Simpson-Mazzoli and the Administration bill in
the status area. Under the earlier scheme, temporary residents had to register with the INS
every three years, but there was no set cut-off point for adjustment of status. Rather the
temporary resident had to wait a minimum of five years from entry to the United States to
adjust to permanent resident. In addition, temporary residents were expressly denied the
right to receive immigration benefits. Administration Bill §§ 302-03, 127 CONG. REC. at
S11,995-96 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
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cept of nationality and status. There are time limits that must be met to
remain eligible and entitlement programs are expressly excluded. These
limitations do not appear to contravene any provisions of the Refugee
Convention, but viewed in the perspective of refugee policy since World
War II, they do indicate a changed American outlook in the face of mass
asylum claims.
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill is silent as to the possible dual application
for temporary resident status and asylum, although the Administration
bill expressly precluded temporary residents from applying for asylum
and pre-emptively denied all pending applications. But availability of
temporary status would certainly discourage asylum applications from
Haitians or Salvadorans, for example, considering that the proof required
for temporary status would be to show time of entrance and not persecu-
tion. Questions would remain, however, as to the status of the asylum
applicant who does not gain eligibility for temporary resident status, par-
ticularly persons from the Americas arriving in 1980 or after.
Under current law, aliens in this country who have not passed through
immigration channels are liable for detention and deportation while those
who are stopped upon arrival in the United States are liable for detention
and exclusion if they "are not clearly and beyond a doubt" entitled to
land.2 42 The Refugee Convention does, however, limit the freedom of the
government in some ways. Article 31 provides that signatories "shall not
impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees
who present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good
cause for illegal entry. 2 4
- Furthermore, the signatories "shall not apply to
the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are
necessary. '2 44 Both sections of article 31 envision a process whereby asy-
lum claims may be determined, and whereby the status or rights available
to the asylum applicant may be defined even when he has violated the
law, but no guidelines are offered.
Article 31 has not been interpreted to mean that illegal entrants may
not be detained, merely that they may not be penalized. If detention is
for purposes other than punishment, it is permissible.2 4 5 This distinction
between discretionary regulatory activity and punitive detention became
a source of considerable controversy because of the internment of
thousands of Haitian boat people across the United States following an
INS policy change in 1981.248 The version of the immigration and asylum
.4. INA, § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1982).
243 Id.
244 Refugee Convention, supra note 21.
145 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219-23 (1972).246 Until 1981 the INS had an informal arrangement with the National Council of
Churches to release Haitians to sponsors after medical screening. Louis v. Nelson, 544F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982). More than 20,000 Haitians paroled in this manner over theprevious 10 years failed to appear at exclusion hearings. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982, at A24,
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bill reintroduced in the House of Representatives provides specifically for
parole from INS detention if an alien is not given an asylum hearing
within 45 days.24 7 This provision is not found in the bill which cleared the
Senate, and it is not clear how a conference would resolve this difference.
For their part, the courts have been struggling to weigh the rights of
the various parties in these situations. In March 1982, a federal district
judge ruled that the detention of eight Haitians by the INS was discrimi-
natory, largely on the basis of evidence that of the 183 non-Haitians
awaiting exclusion hearings at the Brooklyn INS center between July
1981 and January 1982, 182 were freed pending resolution of their claims,
while only three of the 86 Haitians were freed, all of whom were preg-
nant.24 This decision, which had an emotional overtone similar to that of
the district court decision in Haitian Refugee Center, was reversed on
appeal.
G. Rights of Asylum Applicants:
Louis v. Nelson and Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith
The status of asylum applicants to claim due process rights has been
examined most thoroughly in two major class action suits involving Hai-
tians and Salvadorans. Louis v. Nelson began as a request for a tempo-
rary restraining order on behalf of over 1,000 Haitians detained by the
INS in remote areas of Texas, Puerto Rico and West Virginia.249 The
court restrained the INS from commencing or continuing exclusion hear-
ings against Haitians transferred from Miami to outlying areas where
there are few if any interpreters or immigration attorneys. In particular,
the court noted that the INS's failure "to provide notice to the Haitians
of their right to apply for political asylum at an early time . . . frustrates
the Haitian's regulatory right to invoke the determination of the INS Dis-
col. 1.
247 Mazzoli-II, supra note 163, § 123.
248 Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court found an abuse of discre-
tion by the district director under INS regulations, a violation of art. 3 of the Refugee Con-
vention (prohibiting discrimination based on race or national origin), and a violation of
art. 31 (prohibiting unnecessary restrictions of free movement subject only to considera-
tions of national security). This case was reversed in Bertrand v. Sava on the grounds that
the district court substituted its judgment for that of the INS district director and that the
Protocol does not afford refugee seekers rights "beyond those they have under domestic
law." 684 F.2d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit found authority for this in Ming
v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170 (2nd Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975).
249 The case has had a somewhat exotic history. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.
Fla. 1981) (preliminary injunction granted); 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (injunction
retained, jurisdiction retained on some issues of administrative irregularity; dismissed on
other issues for lack of standing and exhaustion of administrative remedies); 544 F. Supp.
973 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (permanent injunction granted); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th
Cir. 1983) (aff'd on grounds of violation of Administrative Procedure Act, rev'd on grounds
that INS did in fact discriminate against Haitians).
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trict Director on the issue." 5 '
After issuance of the TRO, Judge Alcee Hastings was charged with
bribery and the case went to another judge to determine whether to grant
an injunction. In the first rehearing, Judge Eugene Spellman dismissed
most of the complaints for lack of standing but retained jurisdiction to
consider the charge that INS detention policy was discriminatory and
that preventing access to detainees by lawyers from the Haitian Refugee
Center violated constitutional provisions of free speech.25' The third time
around, the district court held that although INS detention policies were
not discriminatory in that a rational basis existed for singling out the
Haitians for detention, the INS had failed to comply with notice and
comment procedures of the APA in issuing a substantive rule that Hai-
tians would have to present a prima facie claim for admission to prevent
detention. The court noted in particular that:
[tihe argument in favor of ... [some sort of due process hearing]
. .. is particularly compelling when the essence of the alien's
claim for admission is based on a fear of persecution upon return
to his homeland. Thus, the "choice" to voluntarily withdraw an
application for admission and thereby be released from detention
may not be a meaningful choice. Indeed, the Plaintiff's failure to
elect this alternative indicates that detention . . . is the lesser of
two evils. 252
In the continuing saga of this litigation, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding and found that the INS had violated the APA
by issuing a substantive rule without proper notice and comment proce-
dures, but reversed on the issue of a denial of equal protection.2 53 Holding
that the Haitian plaintiffs had advanced a prima facie claim that they
were subjected to discrimination as a class, the court ruled that the bur-
den then shifted to the INS to rebut the charge, but that the "mere pro-
testation" of the INS was insufficient.5 4 This holding takes into account
the fact that Congress has plenary power in immigration matters and that
"" Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
"' Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
282 Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978 n.14 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Several days before this
decision, the INS announced it would parole Haitians represented by counsel, who had a
responsible sponsor and gave acceptable assurances that they would appear at exclusion
hearings. Some commentators interpret this as a face-saving move indicating that the INS
expected to lose the case. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982, at A24, col. 1. In his release order,
Judge Spellman specifically stated that he based his view on the right to counsel on repre-
sentations made that suitable attorneys could be found from within the ranks of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, the national and local chapters of the American Immigration Lawyers'
Association, the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights and the Dade County
Bar Association.
253 Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1509 (11th Cir. 1983).
2.. Id. at 1501-02.
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the INS, as representative of the executive branch, is the legitimate dele-
gate of the legislature. But the law must be carried out without discrimi-
nation, the court held, and if behavior of a delegatee of congressional
power is partly motivated by discrimination, which may be found by cir-
cumstantial evidence, the action is illegal. Looking to the facts of the
case, the court found a "stark pattern of discrimination." '2 55 Orantes-Her-
nandez v. Smith, filed on behalf of the Salvadorans, raised another due
process question-the right to be notified of the rights to apply for asy-
lum and to a deportation or exclusion hearing.256 The court permitted the
introduction of considerable evidence about conditions in El Salvador,
both from the State Department and other sources such as Amnesty In-
ternational, to determine what potential harm to the plaintiffs might oc-
cur in El Salvador, and concluded: "Because the Refugee Act specifically
confers the right to apply for political asylum, the Court is compelled to
reject defendants' argument that notice of that right is not required. 2 57
The court enjoined the INS from coercing Salvadorans to accept volun-
tary departure, from failing to notify Salvadorans of the right to apply for
asylum or to have a deportation hearing, from limiting access to counsel
in general and specifically to revoke voluntary departure agreements, and
from placing detained Salvadorans in solitary confinement without hear-
ings. In addition, the court specified procedures to provide greater protec-
tion to class members including bilingual notifications and permission to
retain copies of all notice forms received from the INS.25
It should come as no surprise that courts can provide keen insights into
the issue of due process, and this has been especially true in the area of
the special duties the state owes to potential asylum applicants. Under
article 33 of the Refugee Convention, a contracting state must not send a
person back across a frontier where his life or liberty will be threatened.
The courts have interpreted this to mean that there is a duty to advise a
potential deportee of his rights, even if he does not know them, for if a
person commits a politically relevant act knowingly or even unwittingly
and he will be persecuted for it, he may become a refugee. This approach
conforms to the notion that neither a political act nor the opinion that
spawned it needs to be educated or sophisticated. As Grahl-Madsen has
written, the Refugee Convention was not "drawn up with a view to phi-
255 Id. at 1487.
250 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
25 Id. at 375.
258 Under INS regulations, an alien found liable for deportation "shall be advised" of his
right to file for withholding under § 243(h), which would seem to be consistent with the
obligations assumed by the United States under the Refugee Protocol. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)
(1983). In In re Guiragossian, 17 I. & N. Dec. 161 (1979), the BIA noted, however, that
notification of the right to file for withholding is not required if the deportee has designated
a country to which he would accept deportation.
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losophers, but in order to suit the needs of common men."259
VI. CONCLUSION
Whereas an individual human rights document such as the Refugee
Convention can be based on the needs of the common man, governments
have the task of articulating national interests. The 1980 Refugee Act was
in the tradition of United States refugee policy in that it focused on refu-
gee crises abroad, although it went a long way toward liberalizing that
policy and bringing it into line with current international standards. The
chief oversight in the Refugee Act lies in the field of asylum, where it
provides no guidance as to the national interest in the case of mass asy-
lum claims by persons with a colorable claim to refugee standing. 6 ° While
the Refugee Act and past practice provide a de facto presumption of
refugeehood for groups abroad designated as refugees by Congress or the
Executive, asylum applicants have been held to a stricter test before they
can meet the refugee definition. But in cases of mass asylum requests, the
burden has proved unworkable both because the INS system has not been
able to handle cases fairly from a procedural standpoint, and because the
interplay of foreign policy and the government's view of persecution has
revealed inconsistencies in our treatment of potential refugees.
The issue for the future is to determine a view of the national interest
in asylum cases that will conform to our historical commitment to legality
and to providing a haven for refugees and also to our country's need to
control immigration and to protect foreign policy interests.
One such plan is that espoused by Senator Kennedy in the case of the
Cuban, Salvadoran and Haitian influx. This would be to declare the ar-
rivals refugees (or at least recipients of blanket voluntary departure) by
legislative declaration in order to avoid the often futile job of adjudicat-
ing thousands of cases with little hope of giving each case more than sum-
mary attention. While this approach has the merit of realism, its critics
contend that it would instigate rather than deter attempts to use asylum
as a way to circumvent normal immigration channels. No less significant
is the problem that this plan would perpetuate an essentially politicized
refugee policy in which groups that do not have an American constitu-
ency are at a distinct disadvantage in winning support for their claims of
persecution.2 6'
259 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 47, at 251.
2.0 It is significant that some groups such as the Mexicans fall into a different category in
this discussion. While individual Mexicans may request asylum for various reasons, there
has never been a suggestion that Mexicans as a nationality require asylum either as political
or economic refugees. This is in keeping with the general view that persons from countries
with a record of fair observance of the International Declaration of Human Rights do not
have a basis for claiming that they cannot maintain a normal relationship with their
government.
201 See, e.g., letter from New York City INS employees Carl Johnson, Ignatius Gentile
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Another approach is that incorporated in the immigration control bills
introduced in Congress by the Reagan Administration and Congressmen
Simpson, Mazzoli and others. These bills focus on control of the borders
and presume that all persons entering the country without proper docu-
ments are illegal migrants. This view has its roots in the theory that a
nation is sovereign over matters of immigration and perceives refugee
matters as a smaller issue in the larger problem of immigration. For those
who do arrive and present asylum claims, summary asylum proceedings
with little or no judicial review are sought to unburden the system of the
appeals.
The problem is that United States accession to the Refugee Protocol
may have limited this country's absolute sovereignty in its treatment of
potential refugees. And as it is ultimately up to the courts to interpret the
law, foreclosing judicial review might foreclose a forum for resolving con-
flicting conceptions of our obligations to the United Nations. The courts
have shown considerable sensitivity to these issues, and cases like Mc-
Mullen, Haitian Refugee Center, Louis v. Nelson and Orantes-Her-
nandez have developed a kind of due process concept for asylum appli-
cants.62 which may serve as a United States contribution to the
international understanding of the rights of refugees under the Refugee
Convention.
The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy published
its final report after two years of study in March 1981.263 Although it
favored individualized proof in asylum cases, the Commission recom-
mended that the standard be made similar to that used in determining
refugee admissions. At the basis of such assessments would be a profile of
the country from which the asylum applicant fled. In contrast to the pre-
sent, where that profile comes from the State Department, the recom-
mended profile would come from the newly established independent Co-
ordinator for Refugee Affairs with access to State Department
and Sheldon Dorn, members of Local 1917 of the American Federation of Government Em-
ployees, to the editor of the The Village Voice:
The plight of the Haitians is almost entirely the result of the lack of political
clout exhibited in their behalf. Crack down on illegal Mexican aliens and Lopez
Portillo may turn off his oil spigots. Refuse to admit Soviet Jews as refugees, and
campaign contributions will dry up. Block Eastern Europeans from staying as long
as they want in this country, and the right-wing political ideologues will scream
bloody murder. Even the Cuban boatlift was, at first aided and abetted by a polit-
ical attempt to score points off the Castro regime and concur with the desires of a
politically effective Cuban emigre population. Who cares if the Haitians are
locked up? Nobody.
Feb. 23, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
262 Anker, Due Process and the Asylum Applicant, IMMIGRATION J., Autumn 1982, at 19.
103 SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1981).
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materials."" The problem of asylum and refugee status is overshadowed
by our intense political struggle over immigration policy, particularly the
growing perception that illegal immigration of Hispanics and other mi-
nority groups will erode the political and economic stability of the nation.
Perhaps immigration policy should be totally reformed. However, our
past experience does not indicate that the present family unification pol-
icy which replicates the existing ethnic and racial mix in the country will
be changed for a policy oriented toward the absorption of new groups
from South America, Asia and Africa. But a greater sensitivity toward
North-South issues in foreign policy and its companion, refugee policy, is
inevitable.
As with any intensely political issue, the perception of policy is as im-
portant as the policy itself. United States foreign policy and refugee pol-
icy speak to numerous constituencies-allies, adversaries, domestic inter-
est groups, individuals at home and abroad. Our treatment of refugees
will thus inevitably take into account self-interest and human rights.
The compromise offered by the Select Commission at least looks to-
ward these issues and adopts a middle ground between the harsh policy
that favors efficiency over fairness, on the one hand, and the politically
unfeasible policy of an unchecked open door, on the other. An asylum law
which provides for an impartial fact-finding mechanism within the gov-
ernment (recognizing that foreign policy and refugee needs may conflict),
coupled with the opportunity for the courts to continue to supervise those
on the front line, would reflect the best aspects of America's refugee
experience.
KENNETH D. BRILL
24 Id. at 172-73.
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